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PURCHASE PRICE ALLOCATIONS IN COST
BASIS ACQUISITIONS: SECTIONS 338
AND 1060 UNDER THE 1986 CODE

By
William Rogers and John Lee
INTRODUCTION:
A.

SEPARATE BASKET APPROACH

Senate Committee Restatement of 1954 Code "Law"

A sale of a going business for a lump-sum amount is viewed as a sale of each
individual asset rather than of a single capital asset. Both the buyer and the seller
must allocate the purchase price among the assets for tax purposes. An allocation
by the seller is necessary to determine the amount and character of the gain or
loss, if any, it will recognize on the sale. An allocation by the buyer is necessary to
determine its basis in the assets purchased. This allocation of basis will affect the
amount of allowable depreciation or amortization deductions and the amount and
character of any gain or loss recognized by the buyer on a subsequent sale, and may
have other tax consequences. S. Rep. No. 313, 99 the Cong. 2d Sess. 25 1 (1986).
See generally Leighton, Tax and Accounting Problems on the Purchase of a Basket
of Assets, 28 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 75, 77 (1970).
B.

Asset Acquisition vs. Stock Acquisition
1. General Business Considerations Under the 1954 Code
Neogtiations between the buyer and seller will generally
determine whether an acquisition is a purchase of assets or a
purchase of stock.
A buyer will generally attempt to purchase assets for a
variety of reasons. The strongest motivation to purchase assets
is that the buyer can structure the transaction to precisely fit his
acquisition strategy. Unwanted assets and liabilities can be
excluded from the purchase and, in addition, the haunting spectre
of contingent liabilities existing at the acquisition date can be
eliminated. Further, the incidence of recapture falls on the
seller rather than the buyer.
Rogers, Purchase Price Allocations: New Frontiers-New Hazards, 62 Taxes
813 (1984).

II.

SELLER'S AND BUYER'S ADVERSE TAX GOALS
A.

Senate Committee Restatement of 1954 Code "Law"
1. Seller

In general, a seller will benefit if a larger portion of the purchase price is
allocable to "pure" capital assets, such as goodwill or going concern value, or (to a
lesser extent) to Section 123 1 assets. If the sale is taxable to the seller, allocations
to capital assets will result in tax at the lower capital gains rates, while allocations

to ordinary income assets such as inventory will result in tax at ordinary income
rates. Amounts allocated to Section 1231 assets may result in tax at the
preferential capital gains rate, but could produce depreciation recapture income
under Section 1245 or 1250 or income recognition under the provisions of the
Code. S. Rep. No. 313, supra at 215.
2. Buyer
A buyer, on the other hand, will benefit from an allocation that results in a
higher basis for invetory or other assets that would generate ordinary income if
resold; to depreciable tangible assets such as buildings and equipment; or to
intangible assets having determinable useful lifes, which would be amortizzable. S.
Rep. No. 3 13, supra at 25 1. See generally Rogers, supra at 813.
Ill.

ADVERSE INTERESTS AND CONTRACTUAL ALLOCATION
A.

Senate Committee Restatement of 1954 Code "Law"

Although the parties may agree to a specific allocation of the purchase price
among the assets and reflect this allocation in the sales contract, the Code does
not require such agreement; thus, the contract may simply state the total purchase
price. If the parties do make a specific contractual allocation with appropriate
regard to value they are generally bound by this allocation for tax purposes. See,
2.Z., Ullman v. Comm'r, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959); Comm'r v. Danielson, 378
F.2d 77 1 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858. Similarly, the courts and the
Internal Revenue Service generally accept a stated allocation with appropriate
regard to value provided the parties have adverse tax interests with respect to the
allocation. S. Rep. No. 3 13, supra at 251 (footnote combined with text).
B.

Adverse Interests
1. Benefit-Detriment

The buyer and seller typically are thought to have adverse tax interests
because an allocation that favors one party by reducing its tax burden will tend to
disfavor the other party by increasing its tax burden. See Klayman, Allocation
Problems in Taxable Sales and Purchases of Businesses 16 So. Fed. Tax Inst. G-1,
G-19-G-20 (198 1). Seller generally favors larger allocations to assets producing
long term capital gain upon sale, eg.., land and goodwill. Klayman, supra at G-20.
Buyer conversely generally favors larger allocations to assets that can be
depreciated or amortized rapidly, e.g ., equipment, real estate improvements under
ACRS, and covenants not to compete or property which will be sold shortly in the
ordinary course of the buyer's business resulting in ordinary income, egj.,
inventory. See Klayman, supra at G-20; Leighton, supra at 76-77. See generally
Rogers, supra at 827-28; Attachment "A".
2. Conventional Wisdom as to Tax Consequences of Adverse Interests and
Contracted Allocations. Some cases and many commentators apparently assume
that where buyer's and seller's tax interests are adverse, their contractual
allocation of the purchase price to the component assets generally will be upheld.
See, g., Ullman v. Commissioner 264 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1959) ("The tax
avoidance desires of the buyer and seller in such a situation are ordinarily
antithetical, forcing them, in most cases, to agree upon a treatment which reflects
the parties' true intent. . . ."); accord, Balthorpe v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 28, 32

(5th Cir. 1966) ("The parties' competing tax interest will be a solid barrier to
unrealistic allocations."); Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1961)
("Generally speaking, the countervailing tax considerations upon each taxpayer
should tend to limit schemes or forms which have no basis and economic fact. The
Commissioner should be slow in going beyond the values which the taxpayer states
when such countervailing factors are present. Such a result gives certainty to the
reasonable expectations of the parties and relieves the Commissioner of the
impossible task of assigning fair values to good will and to covenants."); Dubin,
Allocation of Cost to, and Amortization of, Intangibles in Business Acquisitions, 57
Taxes 930, 940 (1979); Faber, Allocation of Purchase Price on Acquisitions
Recapture; Going Concern Value, 39 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 6-6, 6-19 (1982).
Ganier, Treatment of Goodwill: Allocating a Lump-Sum Purchase Price Among
Mixed Assets of a Going Business, 7 J. Corp. Tax. Ill (1980). See generally,
Rogers, supra at 827 (Attachment A). Indeed, in the context of depreciation
recapture, which in many transactions will be the most important allocation, the
regulations provide that if a buyer and seller have adverse interests as to the
allocation of the amount realized between recapture property and nonrecapture
property, any arm's length agreement between the buyer and the seller establish
the allocation. Reg. §§ 1.1245-1(a)(5); 1.1250-1(a)(6)(i). Where the parties in fact
do bargain at arm's length, their allocation establishes the fair market value of the
assets, under the willing buyer-willing seller definition. Ganier, supra.
3. Strong Proof Rule as Between Buyer and Seller.
The prevalent reasoning in the courts is that a taxpayer
must offer "strong proof" in order to demonstrate that an
allocation of costs to which he acceded in the purchase contract
is incorrect. The "strong proof" standard is followed by the Tax
Court and by all of the Circuit Courts of Appeal which have
addressed it except for the Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit.
There are a significant number of cases where the courts have
held that the "strong proof" standard has not been met. Cases
upholding the taxpayer's challenge have been few. The courts
have stated, however, that in order to successfully challenge an
allocation, the taxpayer must show that it either lacked
"economic substance" or "independent significance." Rogers,
supra at 812 (footnotes omitted).
While the majority of courts follow the "strong proof"
standard, a few courts adhere to the stricter standard enunciated
in Danielson v. Commissioner. In addition to the Third Circuit,
Danielson is followed by the Fifth Circuit and by the United
States Claims Court (Proulx v. United States). The burden of the
Danielson case is a heavy one for the challenging taxpayer to
carry since it must show that the purchase contract is
unenforceable because of mistake, undue influence, fraud,
duress, and similar causes. Rogers, supra at 812 (footnotes
omitted).
4. Economic Substance.
a. Introduction. There is a common "feeling" in cases and commentators that
the Service will not disturb the contractual allocation between buyer and seller,
provided that they bargain at an arm's length unless bad faith is shown. This
perception is probably influenced by the confusingly similar, but different "strong

proof" rule under which the taxpayer challenging a contractual allocation must
show strong proof that the allocation does not reflect economic reality. Most of
these cases are quick to point out that the general arm's length allocation rule was
not applicable on the facts before it. Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52, 55 (9th
Cir. 196 1) (seller was apparently unaware that tax benefits which he was willing to
confer upon buyer would be a tax detriment to him.); accord, Kalamazoo Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 693 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1982) (allocation to covenant not to compete
with retiring shareholder not upheld since aged shareholder did not intend to
compete and spent much of his time out of state vacationing in Florida and
covenant ran for life rather than a reasonable period of years); O'Dell & Co. v.
Commissioner. 61 T.C. 461, 468-69 (1974) (listing of authorities denying allocation
to covenant not to compete where no desire or ability).
The reality is that the courts in this area are pulled in "opposite directions"
by the substance over form doctrine and a desire of certainty and ease of judicial
administration. Furthermore, cases and commentators appear at times confused by
the special lore that has developed in the covenant not to compete area such as the
severability test and intent test.
b. Severability Test Yielding to Economic Reality Test. The "severability"
test focused on whether a covenant not to compete could be segregated and valued
separately from other assets transferred, particularly goodwill. See Beghe, Income
Tax Treatment of Covenants Not to Compete, Consulting Agreem-ents and
Transfers of Goodwill 30 Tax Law. 587, 590 (1977). The severability test has been
rejected by most circuit courts in favor of the "economic reality test". See Schulz
v. Commissioner, supra at 56; Beghe, supra at 59 1. Under the economic reality test
a covenant not to compete "must have some independent basis in fact or some
arguable relationship with business reality such that reasonable men, genuinely
concerned with their economic future, might bargain for such an agreement."
Schulz v. Commissioner, supra at 55.
c. Intent Test. The "intent" test sometimes conflicts with the economic
reality test. Compare Annabelle Candy Co. v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 1, 7 (9th
Cir. 1962), and Better Beverages, Inc. v. United States, 619 F.2d 424, 429-30 (5th
Cir. 1980) with Coven v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 295 (1976).
d. Burden of Proof on Taxpayer Challenging Allocation.
Buyer and seller are not necessarily bound by an allocation of purchase price,
but at least as to allocations to covenants not to compete and to goodwill, they will
have a difficult time overturning it. Courts have applied two tests when parties
attempt to repediate a stated allocation to a covenant not to compete or to
goodwill or to supply an allocation where none was provided by the agreement. See
generally, Beghe, supra at 59 1-93. Both tests impose strong burdens of proof on a
party wishing to disavow an allocation to which he has agreed: the "strong proof"
rule and the "Danielson" fraud or duress rule. Compare Ullman v. Commissioner,
u
with Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
858(967). Tribunals have conflicted as to whether the same, particularly strong
proof, test applies to allocations other than to covenants not to compete or
goodwill. Compare Grow v. Commissioner, supra with Banc One Corp. v.
Commissioner supra. Moreover, in many cases the factors looked at under the
strong proof rule were identical to the factors looked at under the economic
substance rule. Compare Coven v. Commissioner, supra and Montesi v.
Commissioner, 340 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1965) with Kalamazoo Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, supra.

5

The Tax Court itself has said it best in Lazisky v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 495
500-02 (1979).
In part the problems in this area arise the tension between
substance and form.
Goodwill is a capital asset which, conventional wisdom tells us,
does not waste. Thus, its purchase is a nonamortizable capital
investment and its sale generates capital gain.
This simple statement of the law belies the great body of
litigation revolving around the question of whether, in any
particular case, a proper, or at least tax-enforceable, allocation
between a covenant not to compete (covenant) and goodwill has
been made. The reports are replete with cases in which one or
both parties have resorted to the courts in their effort to be held
to a contract other than the one they made, or prove the
contract that they would have made had they thought of it.
The courts have reacted in a predictable fashion to this flood
of litigation. Pulled in opposite directions by two powerful
axioms of law, (1) that a person should be free to contract and
that, once made, contracts should be enforced as made (absent
certain enumerated exceptions), and (2) that in the tax law,
substance must prevail over form, the courts have tended to base
their decisions on theories incorporating elements of both these
principles. Equally predictable has been the distribution of
opinions along a continuum according to the emphasis given any
one of these principles in the various jurisdictions. Thus, the socalled "Danielson rule" of the Third Circuit tends to emphasize
form. Yet the rule in that circuit also provides for the court's
right to look to the substance of the transaction in certain
situations:
a party can challenge the tax consequences of his agreement as
construed by the Commissioner only by adducing proof which in
an action between the parties to the agreement would be
admissible to alter that construction or to show its
unenforceability because of mistake, undue influence, fraud,
duress, etc. [Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d
Cir. 1967).]

On the other side of the continuum are such cases as Wilson
Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir.
1955). In that case the parties had failed to provide a specific
allocation of part of the purchase price to the covenants-which
clearly possessed some value. The Seventh Circuit, using purely
substance over form reasoning, reversed our holding that the
covenant was nonseverable from the goodwill and that,
therefore, no amortizable deduction was allowable saying:
But in tax matters we are not bound by the strict terms of the
agreement; we must examine the circumstances to determine the
actualities and may sustain or disregard the effect of a written
provision or of an omission of a provision, if to do so best serves
the purpose of the tax statute.... Therefore, it was the duty of

the tax court and is our duty here to ascertain the true intent,
insofar as tax consequences are concerned. Consequently, it is
immaterial whether the contract did or did not define a specified
amount as the value of the covenant ....
In view of the silence
of the contract in this respect, it became necessary to determine
then from the other evidence whether the covenant had a value,
and if so the amount thereof. Where realistically and actually
the covenant has a discernible value, the purchaser, of course,
may amortize the price paid for it and claim annual deductions
pro rata during the life of the covenant. [Wilson Athletic Goods
Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 357.1
The rule in this Court has tended to fall somewhat between
rules of these two cases. In general we prefer to apply the socalled "strong-proof" rule-or more precisely the "economic
significance" or "economic reality" version of strong proof as
that rule is stated in the oft-cited case of Schulz v.
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 196 1), aff'. 34 T.C. 235
(1960):
we think that the covenant must have some independent basis in
fact or some arguably relationship with business reality such that
reasonable men, genuinely concerned with their economic future,
might bargain for such an agreement. [Schulz v. Commissioner,
294 F.2d at 55.]
Our test is designed to (1) produce predictability (and therefore
reduce litigation) by generally enforcing agreements as made,
and (2) assure at the same time that the Court is not hamstrung
into enforcing obviously substanceless allocations.
Lazisky v. Commissioner. 72 T.C. 495, 500-02 (1979).
5. IRS Challenges: Audit Issues
[Tihe Internal Revenue Service is not bound by the agreement of the parties
and may challenge their agreed-upon allocations. The type of allocation that is
most frequently challenged by the IRS is the assignment of costs to intangible
assets which the purchaser is seeking to amortize.
In order to avoid potential challenges to the assignment of values, the parties
must be prepared to show the allocation was bona fide and, above all, reasonable.
The allocation will be considered bona fide if it contains values that are separately
bargained for at the time the parties come to their "meeting of the minds" in
forming their contract. An example of a post-contractual allodation that was
rejected by the court was in Payne, which featured an attempt to allocate costs to
a covenant not to compete after the original purchase contract had been formed.
Rogers, supra at 815 (footnotes omitted).
IV.

NON-ADVERSE INTERESTS
A. Senate Committee Restatement of 1954 Code "Law"
The interests of the buyer and seller are not necessarily adverse in the case
of Section 1231 assets, since the allocation may result in capital gain (or

nonrecognition of gain under Section 337) to the seller while according depreciable
basis to the buyer. In some circumstances, however, the allocation will produce
recapture income to the seller. In the case or certain intangibles, the parties'
interests also may not be adverse because the seller will recognize capital gain (or
no gain under Section 337) with respect to the intangible, while the buyer may
acquire an amortizable asset. S. Rep. No. 313 supra at 252 (footnotes omitted).
B.

Non Adverse as to Specific Assets or Due to Tax Status of Seller.
1. Specific Assets.

In a few situations the detriment-benefit principle does not apply. For
example, an allocation to an amortizable customer list, will generate an ordinary
deduction for the buyer, but the seller in most instances will recognize a capital
gain. Similarly, where the percentage of Section 1245 and Section 1250 recapture
is identical to seller, buyer's preference of allocating purchase price to shorter
lived depreciable assets over longer-lived depreciable assets, 2.g., real estate
improvements, will make no difference as to seller. See 1 Bittker, Federal
Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, 1 4.4.4, p. 4 - 7 1 note 26 (1981); Amer.
Controlled Indus. v. United States. 55 A.F.T.R. 2d 1 85-498 (S.D. Ohio 1984). In
many instances, however, the percentage of depreciation recaptured will be greater
under Section 1245 as to shorter lived assets than under Section 1250 as to real
estate improvements, the major exception being non-residential real estate
improvements, e.g., plant (unless straight line depreciation is taken albeit on
shortened ACRS life).
For a "laundry list" of various assets with buyer's and seller's tax goals see
Faber, supra at 6-2-6-4; Leighton, supra at 76-77; Frei, Tax Problems in Corporate
Acquisitions Other Reoganizations-From the Seller's Point of View, 52 Taxes 82 1,
832-33 (1974). Covenants not to compete are a classic example of benefitdetriment under old law. Buyer obtains an ordinary deduction (or amortization of a
lump sum paid for a covenant running several years). Seller had ordinary income.
Now, seller is no longer adverse as long as capital gains and ordinary income are
taxed at the same rate, unless seller has a capital loss carry forward.
For a discussion of the special allocation features of amounts allocated to (a)
inventories, (b) favorable leases and contracts, (c) liabilites, and (d) patents,
nonpatented technology, trademarks, trade names and franchises, etc. See Rogers,
supra at 824, 827-28 (Attachment "A").
2. Status of Seller
In many instances buyer's and seller's interests are not completely tax adverse
due to seller particular status. At the one extreme seller may be tax exempt or
have available NOL's, Grow v. Commissioner, 44 CCH T.C.M. 1057 (1984); more
frequently the buyer and seller may be in different tax brackets and even subject to
different accounting rules as to the time value of money which can affect the
bargaining status. See 1 Bittker, supra at 4-69-4-7 1; accord, Klayman, supra at G20. This more discernng approach has indeed been followed by the courts. See
Black Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner 38 CCH T.C.M. 242, 252-53 (1979); Grow v.
Commissioner, supra. Black Indus. acknowledged that agreements reached as a
result of arm's length bargaining between parties with adverse legal interests were
generally respected where there was no reason to question the bona fides of the
transaction, but buyer's and seller's interests in the case before the court were not

"as a practical matter" adverse since seller would offset any gain by net operating
losses. In Grow the Tax Court noted that seller recognized "recapture income" in
the Section 337 sale, but such income was offset by seller's NOL's. Hence, seller
and buyer were not adverse as to the asset purchase allocation. Commentators
generally have concluded that allocations in actual Section 337 sales are more
likely to be upheld on the theory that the interests of buyer and seller are adverse
there, whereas a sale of seller's target stock followed by election of Section 338 by
buyer presents a more extreme case of the absence of conflicting interest between
buyer and seller. See generally, Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions. 38 Tax L.
Rev. 17 1, 289 (1983); Newman, Structuring the Sale of the Closely Held Corporate
Business: Alternative Strategies 41 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax 33-1, 33-53 (1983).
Faber, supra at 6-51-6-52 (only rarely in a seller stock sale will there be a
contractual allocation between buyer and seller with conflicting interests
bargaining at arm's length). Finally, in addition to all of the above factors which
may offset the adverse interests of P and T, an allocation between P and T may
well be determined by the parties' relative bargaining power, rather than by their
best estimate of true fair market value. See Klayman, supra at G-21; Frei, supra
at 833.
a. For a list of "recapture income" items which overrode the 1954 Code
General Utilities see Rogers, supra at 818 (Attachment "A"). For a discussion of
the tax benefit doctrine a similar judicial recapture income override of such shield,
see Rogers, supra at 822-24 (Attachment A).
3. Adverse Interests and Section 337 Sale. Some decisions flatly state that T
is indifferent to individual asset allocations where Section 337 is applicable. Banc
One Corp. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. No. 35 (March 28, 1985). But the better view
is that the interest of buyer and seller are adverse in a Section 337 sale by seller as
to "recapture income" (unless T has offsetting NOLs which will often be the case).
Black Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 253; accord Grow v. Commissioner,
supra (seller had ordinary income under Section 1245 in Section 337 sale; applied
"strong proof" rule discussed below to allocations between Section 1245 property
and non- Section 1245 property). See Ginsburg, supra at 289..
a. Senate Committee View of 1954 Code "Law"
Even if the seller is a liquidating corporation and the sale is governed by
Section 337, so that no gain or loss is recognized except for recapture and certain
other items, the allocation of purchase price may have tax consequences for the
seller. The allocation will determine the amount of recapture income recognized
and may affect the extent to which other income is recognized. S. Rep. No. 313,
supra at 251 (footnote omitted).
i. The quoted passage has all the "earmarks" of a directive to the
drafters of the regulation's to draft an "adversity" standard that takes into
account the better reasoned case law surveyed above.
4. Adverse Interest and Section 338 Stock Sale.
a. Section 338 Regulatory Authority.
Section 338(b)(5) provides that P's "grossed up" basis in its recently purchased
T stock and basis in its nonrecently purchased T stock, adjusted for liabilities and
other relevant items, is to be allocated among the T assets under Treasury
Regulations. The TEFRA legislative history provides no further insight into the

factors to be taken into account under these regulations. Commentators have
questioned whether this provision provides the Treasury any greater authority than
under the general regulation writing grant of Section 7805. Ferguson & Stiver,
Taxable Corporate Acquisitions After TEFRA, 42 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. (Part I)
12-1, 12-46 (1984). The House Ways and Means Committee Report, accompanying
H.R. 4170, does provide some guidance as to such allocation. "It is intended that,
to the extent of the amount taken into account in determining tax attributable to
recapture income from the deemed sale of the target corporation's assets, basis
will be assigned to such assets before the remaining basis, if any, is allocated
among other assets." H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, Part II, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 162 1-22
(1984). This discussion, however, was concerning the House proposal of Neo-T's
basis after the election as based upon the adjusted "fair market value" of Old T's
stock. H.R. 4170, supra at § 612(k)(5). Nevertheless the allocation provision is
substantially identical to current S 338(b)(5). The Conference provision went back
to the formulation of P's grossed up basis with adjustments for liabilities and other
relevant items as the starting point for Neo-T's basis. And the Conference Report
merely states that the "total basis, as under present law [TEFRA § 338(b)], is to be
allocated among the target corporation's assets under regulations." H.R. Rep. No.
98-861, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 1220 (1984). The 1984 Bluebook uses precisely the
same formulation. Joint Committee Staff, General Explanation of Deficit
Reduction Act, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 996 (1984). Query: What effect upon the Ways
and Means's intent?
b. Adverse Interests. Notwithstanding the general view of commentators, P's
and seller's interests in a Section 338 stock sale are theoretically the same as in an
actual asset sale pursuant to Section 337. In both cases seller is taxed as to its
"recapture income" triggered by the actual or deemed Section 337 sale, assuming
that buyer presumably will shift the recapture income tax liability back to the
shareholders of seller through reducing its seller stock purchase price. But see
Holden & McAndrews, The Sale and Purchase of a Corporate Business in a Taxable
Transaction, 24 Tulane Tax Inst. 32, 41 (1975). The reality is that "commercial
exigencies" often prevent buyer from separately evaluating each asset prior to the
acquisition and, hence, calculating in advance target's recapture income tax
liability. "Moreover, although tax reporting often compels an apportionment of the
aggregate purchase price among the individual assets, the purchaser of an operating
business is buying a unitary economic enterprise, not a basket of discrete assets.
The information yielded by an item-by-item appraisal may thus be of little use to a
purchaser,... who bases his investment decisions upon earnings or return on
investment rather than underlying asset values." Banc One Corp. v. Commissioner,
supra at P.H. Tax. Ct. Reports 84-262. See generally Morrison, Tax Problems in
Corporate Acquisitions Other Than Reorganizations-From the Buyer's Point of
View, 52 Taxes 843, 847 (1974). Thus, the reality is that, perhaps more than in an
actual asset sale under Section 337, purchaser and target are more likely not to
have allocated the purchase price asset by asset. This is always the case in a
tender offer. But there Section 338 is selcom if ever elected. Ex post facto
allocations by P fare ill in litigation. See Better -Beverages, Inc. v. United States,
619 F.2d 424, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1980); Banc One Corp. v. Commissioner, supra.

V.

ALLOCATION OF COST WHERE NO CONTRACTUAL ALLOCATION:
A.

GOODWILL

Senate Committee Restatement of 1954 Code "Law"
1. Valuation Aproaches

If the parties to the sale of a going business fail to make an allocation of the
purchase price among the assets of the business that is respected for tax purposes,
the purchase price (less cash and cash equivalents) must still be allocated among
the non-cash assets in proportion to their respective fair market values on the date
of the sale. Fair market value has been defined under one formulation as the price
arrived at by a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under a compulsion
to buy or sell. No single method of valuation is regarded as determinative of value
in all circumstances. Three commonly accepted methods are the reproduction cost
method, the capitalization of earnings method, and the comparable sales method.
2. Goodwill
The valuation of goodwill and going concern value is generally recognized as
more difficult than the valuation of tangible assets or certain other types of
intangibles. The two most commonly used methods to value goodwill and going
concern value are the residual method and the formula method. Under the residual
method, the value of the goodwill and going concern value is the excess of the
purchase price of the business over the aggregate fair market values of the tangible
assets and the identifiable intangible assets other than goodwill and going concern
value. Under the formula method, goodwill and going concern value are valued by
captializing the excess earning capacity of the tangible assets of the business based
upon the performance of the business over some period prior to the valuation
date. The excess earnings capacity is the excess of the average earnings of the
business during this period over an assumed rate of return on the value of its
tangible assets. These excess earnings, capitalized at an appropriate discount rate,
are deemed to be the value of the unidentified intangibles.
3. Formula Valuations
While the Service has recognized a formula method as a permissible method
of valuing goodwill and going concern value, it has also stated the position that the
method is appropriate only where there is no better evidence of the value of these
intangibles. The courts appear reluctant to apply the formula method because of
the subjectivity involved in selecting the appropriate rate of return and
capitalization rate. In cases where the value of tangible and identifiable assets can
be ascertained with reasonable certainty, the courts have generally rejected the
formula approach in favor of the residual method.
4. Second-Tier Allocations
In some cases a taxpayer who has purchased a going business at a premium
(that is, the price that it has determined exceeds the apparent aggregate fair
market values of the tangible and intangible assets, including goodwill and going
concern value) might take the position that it is entitled to allocate an amount in
excess of fair market value to the basis of individual assets. Relying on one
interpretation of the judicial and administrative authorities, the taxpayer would
separately value each of the acquired assets and allocate the premium among all
the assets (other than cash and cash equivalents) in proportion to their relative fair

market values in a so-called "second-tier allocation." S. Rep. No. 313, supra at
252-53 (footnotes omitted and headings added).
B.

Valuation Methods
The most accepted approach to allocation of costs among
the assets purchased is to determine their respective fair market
values. Fair market value has been sanctioned by the courts and
described as the price arrived at by a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under the compulsion to buy or sell and both
being informed of the facts. The fair market value of some
assets is simple to ascertain; for example, the fair market value
of cash and cash equivalents such as accounts receivable is
determined by their face values, while those of marketable
securities may be ascertained by current market quotations.
Other less liquid assets must be valued by more sophisticated
methods. An independent appraisal of assets generally affords
the taxpayer with a reliable, methodically derived valuation that
is often upheld in court. While appraisal techniques were
originated and developed in the valuation to any asset. The three
methods of appraisal most commonly applied are reproduction
cost, the capitalization of net income, and the comparable sales
method. All three methods are often used in an appraisal as a
check on reliability.
Reproduction cost, in general, is the cost of replacing an
existing asset with another asset that has equivalent
characteristics. An asset with equivalent characteristics is one
that offers comparable net income to the business and one that
.has similar legal and business characteristics. For example, a
replacement for a factory would be one with comparable
facilities, similar services, and equivalent earning power. In
order to determine replacement cost, it is necessary to estimate
the costs of reconstructing an asset. Replacement values of
some assets, such as machinery and equipment, may be derived
from manufacturer's price lists. On the other hand, detailed and
time consuming engineering and accounting surveys may be
needed to derive accurate cost estimates of other specialized
assets.
Once the cost of replacing the asset is determine, this
amount is reduced by depreciation in order to compute the
current value of the asset.
Three types of depreciation may be taken into account,
namely, actual physical deterioration of the asset, functional or
technological obsolescence due to changes in style or design
occurring since the asset was first placed in service, and
economic obsolescence reducing the value of the asset by virtue
of a lessened demand for the product or service associated with
the asset. These concepts of depreciation differ from the
traditional accounting measures of depreciation, which simply
allocate the cost of an asset to its periods of use in the
business. Further, income tax depreciation concepts are also
different since they may have economic goals, such as
stimulation of the economy.

Determining depreciation for replacement cost purposes is
often based on the experiences of the individual appraiser and
thus may highly subjective. Using the replacement cost method
as the sole determination of value may be dangerous, therefore,
since the IRS's engineers and appraisers may derive less
favorable appraisals based upon their own experience and
judgment.
A second method of appraisal is the comparable sales
method of market data approach. In practice, the comparable
sales method requires that an asset be compared with similar
assets of the same class and type which have been sold
recently. The comparable sales method of appraisal is especially
useful in valuing unique assets, such as parcels of real estate,
since the method is objectively verifiable and is less dependent
on judgment than the replacement cost method. However, the
degree to which an asset is unique may also present pitfalls in
applying the comparable sales method because the properties to
be compared should share as many characteristics as possible.
For example, if the value of a factory is to be determine, a
comparable factory should be one in a similar (or same) location,
and of similar age and functions, etc. Since no two assets are
alike, the comparable sales method may be unavailable if there
are no comparable sales. It may be necessary to resort to
comparing bid and ask prices of comparable assets that are on
the market but have not been sold. Care must be taken in
drawing comparisons in cases where an actual sale has not been
consummated since the bid and ask prices may not reflect fair
market value. The comparable sales method is useful, therefore,
but its application may be limited by a lack of recent sales of
similar assets and by a lack of comparability between the assets.
A final appraisal method is the net income method which,
unlike the first two methods previously discussed, focuses on
future income flows to be derived from an asset rather than on
historical values based on past sales or costs. The future income
flows are discounted to reflect their present value once they are
determined. There are two critical steps in the net income
method, namely, the determination of income flows and the
selection of an appropriate discount factor.
Each of these steps involves judgment on the part of the
appraiser. For example, both gross income and related expenses
have to be estimated in order to derive the future net income
stream. This may not be too difficult if the long-term future
income streams of an asset are locked in. For example, real
property may be subject to a long-term lease and a patent may
be subject to a licensing agreement. In other cases, income
projections must be made based on past individual or industry
experience tempered by industry trends and economic data in
general
The other factor to be determined in the net income
m-thod is the discount rate to be used. Different methods of

developing a discount rate have been described, including the
"summation" method, the "band of investment" method, and the
"comparison" method. The first method, summation, involves
assigning percentages to different factors associated with the
investment and accumulating them. Some factors may include
the risk-free interest rate on U.S. Treasury securities; a risk
factor to be assigned to compensate the taxpayer for using funds
to purchase an asset for a "risky" venture, rather than investing
the funds in Treasury securities; a rate to be assigned to
compensate the taxpayer for the efforts it expends in managing
the asset; and finally, a rate to compensate the taxpayer for the
nonliquidity of the asset.
The "band of investment" method requires identification of
the cost of financing the asset (i.e., the cost of borrowing the
money) and the rate of return required on the equity of the
taxpayer. The percentage of the asset financed by the taxpayer's
own funds (equity) is multiplied by the required rate of return on
equity. Similarly, the percentage of debt financing is multiplied
by the interest rate. These two products are then added to
derive the appropriate discount factor. As an example, assume
that an asset is financed 80 percent by debt and 20 percent by
equity. Further assume that the interest rate is 10 percent and
that the required return on equity is 15 percent. The discount
factor would be determined as follows:
% of value
Rate
Product
Equity ..................
Debt ...................

20
80

15%
10%

3%
8%
11%

In this case, the discount rate would be 11 percent.
The "comparison" method simply involves "comparison of the
reactions of buyers and sellers in the market place and is related to
the net income provided by properties that have been sold at known
prices."
In summary, where the buyer and seller do not agree, allocation
of costs is required in a multiple asset purchase. "Fair market value"
is the most appropriate measure, but for some types of assets it is
difficult to determine. For these assets, appraisal is the best way to
measure fair market value. Various methods are available and should
be used in combination due to subjective factors involved in each
method. Rogers, supra at 815-17 (footnotes omitted).
C.

IRS Allocation of Purchase Premium to Goodwill or Going Concern Value.
1. Purchase Premium. A "purchase" premium is the excess of the purchase
price over the "fair market value" of the hard assets. Such purchase premium can
arise from a number of factors. Commentators have asserted that the Section 338
election presents the most extreme case of "absence of conflicting interest
between taxpayers. P is the only interested party. There is no policeman at all. It

is, therefore, reasonable to anticipate that the Treasury will approach with
enthusiasm the task of writing allocation regulations and will, among other things,
focus explicitly on the goodwill issue." Ginsburg, supra at 289; Newman, supra at
3-53; see generally Ferguson & Stiver, supra at 12-46-12-47. These commentators
clearly were referring to the Service's practice under pre-TEFRA § 334(b)(2) of
seeking to allocate some or all of such purchase premium paid by P for the T stock
upon the subsequent liquidation of T to non-amortizable goodwill or going concern
value. See generally, Donaldson, Goodwill and Other Intangibles in Business
Acquisitions, 31 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 291 (1973); Faber, supra at 6-33-6-41;
Ganier, supra at 120-28. However, the same problem exists with Section 337 asset
sales.
a. For a discussion of various methods of determining the portion of the
purchase price allocable to "goodwill" or going concern value, including ARM 34.
See Faber, supra; Ganier, supra.
b. The judicial rationale for denial of amortization of purchased goodwill is
shaky. Probably the unarticulated rationale is an abhorrence of an amortizable
cost basis step-up by buyer without seller paying the appropriate toll charge,
coupled with the judicial administrative difficulties encountered in determining the
portion of the premium which is amortizable and the appropriate amortization
period.
c. For an in-depth discussion of "goodwill" and "going concern" value see
Rogers, supra at 820-22 (Attachment A).
2. Amortizable Purchase Premium.
Some courts have permitted buyer to carve out from the purchase premium a
cost allocable to intangible assets which show have a definitely determinable life so
that amortization is possible. See Gregorcich, Amortization of Intangibles: A
Reassessment of the Tax Treatment of Purchased Goodwill, 28 Tax Law. 25 1, 26871.
a. The case law has gradually evolved away from a "mass asset" rule denying
amortization to purchased goodwill, see generally Klayman,. supra at G-3 I-G-32.
More recently taxpayers have been able to carve out an amortizable amount where
they could show on a statistical basis decline in value or utility, e.., attrition of
customers or of the asset. Klayman, supra at G-32-G-33.
b. In a real sense the current tax treatment allowing deductions
payments under target's or its shareholders, covenants not to compete
deduction for payments for target's goodwill, is a judicial compromise
current deduction without the necessity of determining the useful life
amortizable purchase premium.

for P's
but no
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c. Commentators readily suggest that the courts can approximate under
Cohan the amount of the purchase premium which is amortizable and the
appropriate amortization period. In reality, however, the Tax Court has found it
relatively easy to make Cohan approximations only where the question was an
allocation between a covenant not to compete and non-amortizable goodwill. See,
._j.,
Peterson Machine Tool, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 72, 86 (1982); accord
Levine v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 1963). Where, however, the
''tan
_Lation
-U
to non-amortizable going concern value review courts have

on occasion required some rational basis for the Cohan approximation. See
Concord Control, Inc. v. Commissioner, 80-1 USTC 1 9248 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'
and remanding in part, 35 CCH T.C.M. 1345 (1976). Moreover, the Tax Court is
beginning to recognize the administrative as well as equitable problems with
approximation. See Grow v. Commissioner, supra: see also Nessing v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 505, 512 (1967).
d. See discussion on "Valution and Amortization of Intangible Assets,"
Rogers, supra at 824-28 (Attachment A).
3. Abuse of Buyer Step-Up Without Appropriate Seller Toll Charge Under
Prior Law.
The underlying basis for the Service's opposition to buyer amortization of
purchase premium is that if the Treasury
"were to allow a write-off of purchased goodwill over a long
period of time as a deduction from ordinary income while the
sale of goodwill would produce capital gain, we would have a
situation in which the purchaser would be able to write-off the
goodwill against ordinary income, but the seller would always
have capital gain.
I think one of our problems is whether we could ever
change one rule without changing the other.
I think that people would be rather reluctant to see the sale
of goodwill treated as an ordinary income item under section
1245 or otherwise, and it might be necessary to take the bitter
with the sweet. This is part of the problem that would face us.
Statement by Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy Edwin S. Cohen,
quoted in a Panel Discussion, Accounting Principles or Pooling of Interests, 25 Tax
Law. 29, 54 (1971). The anti-selectivity search of TEFRA and the focus of the ALl
Corporate Proposals and the Senate Finance Committee Staff proposals on explicit
toll charges to T for P cost basis acquisitions, may have intensified the Service's
awareness of the imbalance of the current limited rules permitting buyer cost basis
acquisition and amortization with seller escaping ordinary income taxation or under
Section 337 taxation completely. Commentators had worried that the Service
might be tempted to apply a tax benefit theory to seller in a Section 337 sale where
buyer obtained an amortizable basis step-up. See Bonovitz, supra at 34 N.Y.U. Inst.
on Fed. Tax. at 72-73; Rogers, supra at 822-24. The full impact of Hillsboro
National Bank v. Commissioner, supra has yet to be felt in this area. Indeed,
General Utilities repeal could be viewed as a surrogate recapture for previously
deducted expansion and advertising costs, etc. See Wolfman, 5 Va. Tax Rev. at
696.
a. When the General Utilities repeal is fully in effect as to a selling
corporation and the capital gains repeal as to a selling corporation and noncorporate sellers a sale of goodwill is recognized in practical effect as ordinary
income. Further reform in this area should therefore permit amortization of
purchased goodwill or going concern value over say a 60 month period. Cf. Section
195, providing amortization of self-created going concern value, i.e., start-up
costs.

VI.

SECTION 338 RESIDUAL ALLOCATION
A. Senate Committee Restatement of Section 338 Reg's Residual Allocation
Method
Proposed and temporary regulations recently issued by the Treasury
Department under Section 338 mandate a residual method of allocation (and
prohibit a second-tier allocation) in determining the basis of assets acquired in a
qualified stock purchase for which a Section 338 election is made or is deemed to
have been made, i.e., a stock purchase which is treated as a purchase of assets for
tax purposes. The deemed purchase price of the assets is first reduced by cash and
items similar to cash, and is then allocated sequentially to two defined classes of
identifiable tangible and intangible assets; any excess is allocated to assets in the
nature of goodwill and going concern value. After the reduction for cash items, no
amount may be allocated to any asset in the next two classes in excess of its fair
market value. S. Rep. No. 3 13, supra at 253 (footnotes omitted).
B.

Detailed Analysis of Temporary Section 338 Regs Mandatory Residuary
Allocation
1. Residual Method.
The adjusted grossed-up basis (AGUB) must be allocated
among Neo-T's assets as of the beginning of the day after
the acquisition date pursuant to the rules undef Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T, 51 Fed. Reg. 359 1-92 (January
29, 1986). Generally, the AGUB is allocated first to Class I
assets, then in turn to Class II, III and IV assets. Class I
assets consist of cash, demand deposits and similar bank or
savings and loan accounts. Class II assets include
certificates of deposit, government obligations, and other
readily marketable stock and securities. Class III assets
are all assets other than Class I, II and IV assets. Class IV
assets are intangible assets in the nature of goodwill and
going concern value. Within each class, basis is allocated
according to fair market value. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.338(b)-2T(b), 51 Fed. Reg. 3591. The amount of AGUB
allocated to an asset (other than Class IV assets) is limited
to the asset's fair market value at the beginning of the day
after the acquisition date. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)2T(c)(1), 51 Fed. Reg. 3591. However, this fair market
value may be subsequently modified with respect to certain
contingent income assets. Id.; Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.338(b)-3T(g), 51 Fed. Re-g. 3593-94.
The Temporary Regulations also provide a
"transitional allocation election" for stock acquisitions that
occurred after 8-31-82 and before 1-30-86, or under a
written contract entered into between those dates. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-4T, 51 Fed. Reg. 23742 (July 1,
1986). A corporation which makes such an election may
allocate AGUB pursuant "to the rules of Federal income
tax law that apply to the purchase on the acquisition date
of a combination of assets for a lump sum." Temp. Treas.
Reg. S 1.338(b)-4T(e)(2), 51 Fed. Reg. 23743 (July 1,

1986). In other words, an electing corporation is not bound
by the fair market value limitation in the Temporary
Regulations. However, any allocation which exceeds an
asset's fair market value will be carefully scrutinized by
the I.R.S. Temp. Treas. Reg. S 1.338(b)-4T(e)(4), 51 Fed.
Reg. 23743 (July 1, 1986). Lee & Bader, supra at
n.87.
For a discussion on the old allocation rules under Section
338 see Rogers, supra at 817-19 (Attachment "A").
2.

Contingent Income

a. Introduction.
The proposed temporary Section 338 3T regulations
purport to incorporate such prior law in the form of
"general tax law principles." But then they apply such
general principles year 2 in the context of a P contingent
payment for Old T stock in a manner judicially and
administratively unprecedented year 1 - year 2 construct,
providing that (1) Old T must recognize in year 2 gain or
loss arising from a year 2 change in Old Ts deemed sales
price, which is reported by Neo-T in year 2 but (2) Neo-T's
year 2 tax as to income or loss resulting from such change
is determined as if such gain or loss had been recognized
"[t]o the extent general tax law principles require seller to
account for adjustment events" in Old T's taxable year
ending on its acquisition date (year 1) on which P acquired
80% control of T's stock, and (3) Neo-T must separately
account in year 2 for such year 2 income as an item of Old
T, subject to Old T's tax attributes unexpired as of the end
of such year. The temporary regulations specifically leave
the matter of any year 2 (or 5 or 25) original issue discount
arising out of the year 2 payment to the regulations under
Sections 1274 and 1275(d) or 483. Those regulations would
impute interest based on the years lapsed since year 1 into
the year 2 contingent payment, thereby reducing the
principal payment portion of the contingent payment, the
only portion that the temporary Section 338 contingent
income regulations specifically apply to.
The proposed and temporary Section 338 regulations
allocate P contingent payment in year 2 to Neo-T's assets
in that year under a "residual method" of allocation
formula, which generally limits such year 2 allocation
limits allocation to year 1 fair market value, viz., fair
market value on the day following the acquisition date, i.e.,
Neo-T's deemed purchase date, with the exception of
goodwill and going concern value. Thus, generally all year
2 contingent payments would be allocated to such goodwill,
unless P's base price for control of T was less than fair
market value on such deemed purchase date or were
attributable to a specified asset.

2. Validity of Regulation's Year 1 - Year 2 Construct.
The temporary and proposed regulations treat Old T
as continuing until year 2, as may be seen in Example (4),
where P purchased control of Old T on January 1, 1987 and
timely elected Section 338. In 1990 (Year 4) P makes a
theretofore contingent payment, e
an earnout, for the
stock of Old T, which is allocated in part to Section 1245
property (because P's base price was less than fair market
value).
As a result additional income is recognized under
Section 1245 by Old T for 1990 on the deemed sale of
61d T's assets. This income must be reported on the
consolidated return of new T [Neo-TI for 1990, but it
is separately accounted for and may not be absorbed
by losses or deductions of P or of new T.
Since the 1982 legislative history treats Neo-T or new T
as a new corporation either as the selling or purchasing
corporation as to tax liability with a clean slate of tax
attributes, one presumed therefore Old T was dead. While
the 1984 House bill would have specifically addressed the
problem of contingent payouts at the T level, the 1984
Conference bill instead left prior general principles
undisturbed. Under such principles a T liquidated T no
longer in existence in year 2 when contingent income
matures is not taxable in year 2, or year 1. Assuming
arguendo that Old T continues, the articulation of the
temporary regulations result through measurement of Old
T's year 2 income by recomputing its year 1 income and
then including that hypothetical increase in year 1 tax in
Old T's year 2 income which new T separately reports in
year 2 smacks of a legislative solution and clearly
contravenes existing general tax principles. The Annual
Accounting Principle bars reopening Old T's year 1.
Technically, however, the temporary regulation's solution
does not constitute reopening year 1 if interest is not
charged from year I by the Treasury on Neo-T's year 2
addition to income. Nevertheless, the recomputation of
year 1 - addition to year 2 as articulated is closer to a
legislative solution than the existing judicial year 2
correlative adjustment exceptions to the annual accounting
principle.

3. Impact of Time Value of Money Principles.
The proposed time value of money regulations would
first separate the contingent P payments for the Old T
stock from the non-contingent or fixed payments. If the
year 2 contingent P payment does not provide adequate
interest for the years elapsed since 1, such proposed
regulations bifurcate the year 2 payment into (1) a
principal payment equal to the discounted year 1 value of

the total contingent P payment made in year 2 and (2) the
balance is considered interest.
The proposed and temporary Section 338 contingent
payment regulations expressly state that the examples
illustrating year 2 payment by P of theretofore contingent
amounts are "exclusive of interest" and cross refer to the
regulations under Sections 1274 and 1275(d) or 483 for rules
characterizing deferred contingent payments as principal
or interest. Implicitly, therefore, the year 1 - year 2
separate return construct of contingent payment allocation
and income portion of the proposed and temporary may
only apply to the principal portion of the year 2 P
contingent payment. The principal portion of the
contingent payment was earned by Old T in year 1, but the
interest portion was not. Indeed, where the contingent
payment claim is distributed to the former T shareholders
on the acquisition date, the entire OID is earned by the
former T shareholders. A subsequent distribution could
result in some OID at the T level, but it should be a
consolidated return item of Neo-T in year 2. The final
regulations should address this.
omitted).
Lee & Bader, supra at _(footnotes
b. For a how-to discussion on tying contingent payments to patents, nonpatented technology, trademarks, trade names, and franchises, etc. See Rogers,
supra at 828-29 (Attachment "A").
VII.

RATIONALE FOR ENACTMENT OF SECTION 1060: PARITY BETWEEN ASSET
AND STOCK ACQUISITIONS
A.

Audit-Administrative Difficulties According to Senate Committee

The [Senate Finance] committee is aware that the allocation of purchase
price among the assets of a going business has been a troublesome area of the tax
law. Purchase price allocations have been an endless source of controversy
between the Internal Revenue Service and taxpayers, principally because of the
difficulty of establishing the value of goodwill and going concern value. The
Service lacks the resources to challenge allocations to goodwill or going concern
value in all or even a substantial portion of the cases in which it would otherwise
assert that the value of those assets are misstated. S. Rep. No. 3 13, supra at __.
1. Trend Towards Judicial Restraint. The Congressional focus on source of
controversies which can't be handled by the audit-judicial system and choosing a
bright-line - purchase, premium over value of (hard?) assets - parallels recent
judicial developments towards bright-line construction of Section 122 1, Arkansas
Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1986), and Section 302(c), Lynch
(9th Cir. Oct. 8, 1986). Accordingly, courts (or the
F.2d
v. Commissioner,
regulation drafters)-may view amortizable carve-outs from purchase premium with
suspicion, especially if such a view maintains the statute. All the more reason for
statutory ordinary income treatment of sales of goodwill - going concern value
coupled with amortization by the purchaser.
_

B.

Identification of Premium With Goodwill Mandate of Congress in Section 1060.

The [Senate Finance] committee believes that it is appropriate to treat the
"premium" involved in second-tier allocations as a payment for assets in the nature
of goodwill or going concern value, rather than a payment in excess of the total
value of the purchased assets. The committee therefore is requiring taxpayers to
apply the residual method in allocating basis to goodwill and going concern value in
all purchases of a going business. The mandatory application of the residual
method is also warranted in view of the difficult and uncertain assumptions that
are demanded by the application of the formula method and the excessive amount
of conflict generated between taxpayers and the Service concerning its application.
C.

Incorporation of Section 338 Residual Allocation Regulations

The method adopted by . . . [new Section 1060] is identical to that provided in
the regulations under Section 338 for allocating purchase price to assets following a
stock purchase. Thus, the committee's solution will not only tend to reduce
controversies between the Service and taxpayers, it will also eliminate disparities
between asset purchases and stock purchases treated as asset purchases under
Section 338 insofar as purchase price allocations are concerned.
In adopting the basis allocation rules as prescribed by the Section 338.
regulations, the committee intends no inference as to the propriety under present
law of methods of allocation in asset acquisitions other than the residual methods.
D.

Mandatory Reporting by Seller and Buyer

The committee is also concerned about the potential for abuse inherent in the
sale of a going business where there is no agreement between the parties as to the
value of specific assets. In many instances the parties' allocations for tax reporting
purposes are inconsistent, resulting in a whipsaw of the government. The
committee expects that requiring both parties to use the residual method for
allocating amounts to nonamortizable goodwill and going concern value under new
Section 1060 may diminish some of this "whipsaw" potential The committee has
also authorized the Treasury Department to require reporting by parties to the sale
of a business, so that information reporting may be required regarding amounts
allocated to goodwill and going concern value and to any other categories of assets
or specific assets, and such other information as the Secretary deems necessary or
appropriate. S. Rep. No. 313, supra at 253-54 (headings added and emphasis
supplied).
VIE.

SECTION 1060
A.

General Rule: Mandatory Residual Method Allocation
1. Non-Contingent Purchase Price

[Section 1060(a)] requires that, in the case of any "applicable asset
acquisition," both the buyer and the seller must allocate purchase price in the
manner prescribed in Section 388(b)(5). Thus, both parties must use the residual
method as described in the regulations under Section 388. See Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.338(b)-2T. An applicable asset acquisition is any transfer-of assets constituting
a business in which the transferee's basis is determined wholly by reference to the
purchase price paid for the assets. [Section 1060(c)].

Both direct and indirect transfers of a business are intended to be covered by
this provision, including, for example, a sale of a business by an individual or a
partnership, or a sale of a partnership interest in which the basis of the purchasing
partner's proportionate share of the partnership's assets is adjusted to refect the
purchase price.
A group of assets will constitute a business for this purpose if their character
is such that goodwill or going concern value could under any circumstances attach
to such assets. For example, a group of assets that would constitute an active
trade or business within the meaning of Section 355 will in all events by considered
a business for purposes of this provision. Moreover, businesses that are not active
businesses under Section 355 will also be subject to this rule.
In requiring use of the residual method, the committee does not intend to
restrict in any way the ability of the Internal Revenue Service to challenge the
taxpayer's determination of the fair market value of any asset by any appropriate
method. For example, in certain cases it would be reasonable for the Service to
make an independent showing of the value of goodwill or going concern value as a
means of calling into question the validity of the taxpayer's valuation of other
assets.
[Section 1060(b)] also authorizes the Treasury Department to require
information reporting by the parties to an applicable asset acquisition. This may
include information regarding amounts allocated to goodwill or going concern
value, as well as any other categories of assets or specific assets, and such other
information as it deems necessary or appropriate. S. Rep. No. 313, supra at 254-55
(emphasis supplied).
a. Cost Basis or "Purchase Price Paid" Requirement
i. Indirect asset acquisition: partnership interest
Seller and buyer probably have to report to the IRS information about the
inside partnership asset only if Section 754 election is made so Section 734
applies. But query re Section 732(d).
ii. Inheritance, etc., although resulting in a fair market value basis and,
hence, opportunity for misallocations of basis by the new owners poses less of
a seller problem, since the decedent is taxed on the passage of title at death,
or whenever. Inheritance does not appear to be caught by Section 1060.
iii. Query do in-kind corporate distributions trigger Section 1060? When
a shareholder receives a distribution of property taxable to him/her as a
diVidend under Section 30 1, a redemption or even partial liquidation under
Section 302, as a liquidating distribution under Section 331 or a "boot"
distribution under Section 356 the net effect of these provisions and Sections
3 11, 336 and 36 l(b) when fully effective, is to give the shareholder a fair
market value basis, Section 30 l(d) and Sections 302(a) and 1012, and to tax the
distributing corporation as if it had sold the assets for fair market value.
Indeed, in a qualifying redemption and liquidation, the shareholder is treated as
having exchanged all or a part of his/her stock for the distributed property.
Sections 302(a) and 33 1. Does Section 1060 apply? These transactions pose
the same potential for abuse that engaged enactment of Section 1060, but the
definitional "applicable asset acquisition" trigger of Section 1060(c)(2) refers
to transferee's basis determined by reference to "the consideration paid" and
the Senate Committee report quoted above refers to "purchases."

iv. "Determined wholly by reference"
Where a controlling shareholder transfers under Section 351 a business
for non-recognition property (stock or securities) and for boot, the transferee
corporation's basis under Section 362 in the business is not wholly determined
by reference on the "boot" consideration it "paid" for the property. Thus
Section 1060 appears inapplicable. Boot in a like-kind or similar exchange
under Section 103 1, etc. should be similarly excluded.
b. Assets Constituting a "Trade or Business"
i. By reference to Section 355's trade or business standard did Congress
mean to incorporate existing Treas. Reg. Section 1.355-1(c) and in particular
its "independent production of income" and "incidental activities" standards
designed to preclude functional divisions or the more liberal 1977 proposed
regulations which permit functional divisions'.
ii. The case law is no answer because more recent Section 355 decisions
are more consonant with (and triggered) the proposed regulations while
decisions applying the "partial liquidation" provisions (whose regulation's
incorporate the existing judicially discredited Section 355 regulations), readily
follow the old Section 355 regulations. Compare Rafferty v. Commissioner,
452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied 408 U.S. 922 (1971) with Blashka v.
United States, 393 F.2d 983 (Ct. CL 1968) and Kenton Meadows Co. v.
Commissioner, 766 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1985).
2. Contingent Purchase Price
a. Allocation
The temporary Section 338 regulations treat taxation of contingent payments
in a different section than the residual method allocation section. But the residual
method section does speak to allocation of contingent payments - essentially to
Class IV, i.e., non-amortizable goodwill, unless tied to a specific asset. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-T.
The question of who is taxed on contingent purchase price received in a
subsequent year (year 2) and how to determine the amount of taxable income is
treated in Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T, see p.
supra, while the legislative
history refers only to § 1.338(b)-2T, the residual allocation provisions. Thus,
Section 1060 does not appear to incorporate the taxation provisions into asset
acquisitions.
b. Income
The Section 338 taxation of Neo-T in year 2 of any gains triggered by
reallocation of based upon a hypothetical increase in old T's year 1 income creates
a discontinuity with asset acquisitons followed by liquidation of target.
The proposed and temporary Section 338 3T regulations governing year 2
contingent payments illustrate a year 2 increase in Neo-T's separate return
recapture income arising from a year I non-contingent P price at less than fair
market value of Old T's assets plus a year 2 contingent P payment.
Thus, for example, if after the acquisition date there is an
increase in the allocable aggregate deemed sale price of Section
1245 property for which the recomputed basis (but not the

adjusted basis) exceeded the portion of the aggregate deemed
sales price allocable to that particular asset on the acquisition
date, the additional gain shall be treated as ordinary income to
the extent it does not exceed such excess amount .... The
amount of tax on income of Old target recognized . . . [by in
year 2 by Old T and reported by Neo-T in its year 2 "separate
return'i is determined as if such income had been recognized in
Old target's taxable year ending at the close of the acquisition
date. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(j) Ex. (4)(v).
Thus, Neo-T would be taxed in year 2 only to the extent the P contingent payments
are allocable as of year 1 or 2 values to assets generating recapture income or
other exceptions to the Section 337 General Utilities shield; the deemed Section
337 shield would continue to apply in year 2 to contingent income allocable to nonrecapture items.
Yet in a T asset sale structured as a Section 337 transaction, T is liquidated,
usually in year 1. Under conventional doctrine a liquidating T is not taxed in year 1
upon distribution to its shareholders of P's contingent payment obligation as to any
additional recapture income that might arise in year 2 due to the contingent
payments since they cannot be valued in year 1. Moreover, since T will not be in
existence when the contingency is resolved under an earnout in year 2, conventional
doctrine would not tax Old T in year 2 either as to any recapture income created
then by the contingent payments. See Lee & Bader, supra
. In contrast in a
Section 338 contingent earnout transaction, the proposed and temporary regulations
as shown above would tax Neo-T in year 2 as to P's contingent purchase price
payments made to the former T shareholders in year 2 to the extent they create
additional recapture income. Thus, new discontinuities would be created under the
proposed and temporary regulation's approach, contrary to the intent of Congress.
Other incongruities arise if target distributes contingent income item to its
shareholders in a bootstrap acquisition of targets stock or assets by P. Lee &
Bader, supra at __ (footnotes omitted).
IX.

EFFECT OF GENERAL UTILITIES REPEAL
A.

General Utilities Concept
1. General Principle: House Committee Restatement of "Law"

As a general rule, corporate earnings from sales of appreciated property are
taxed twice, first to the corporation when the sale occurs, and again to the
shareholders when the net proceeds are distributed as dividends. At the corporate
level, the income is taxed at ordinary rates if it results from the sale of inventory
or other ordinary income assets, or at capital gains rates if it results from the sale
of a capital asset held for more than six months. With certain exceptions,
shareholders are taxed at ordinary income rates to the extent of their pro rata
share of the distributing corporation's current and accumulated earnings and
profits.
An important exception to this two-level taxation is the so-called General
Utilities rule. The General Utilities rule permits nonrecognition of gain by
corporations on certain distributions of appreciated property to their shareholders
and on certain liquidating sales of property. Thus, its effect is to allow
appreciation in property accruing during the period it was held by a corporation to

escape tax at the corporate level At the same time, the transferee (the
shareholder or third-party purchaser) obtains a stepped-up, fair market value basis
under other provisions of the Code. Accordingly, the "price" of a step up in the
basis of property subject to the General Utilities rule is typically a single, capital
gains tax paid by the shareholder on receipt of a liquidating distribution from the
corporation.

Numerous limitations on the General Utilities rule, both statutory and
judicial, have developed over the years. Some directly limit the statutory
provisions embodying the rule, while others, including the collapsible corporation
provisions, the recapture provisions, and the tax benefit doctrine, do so indirectly.
H.R. Rep. No. 426, 99th Cong. Ist. Sess. 274-75 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
2. 1954 Codification
Corporate level non-recognition was initially provided as to non-liquidating
distributions of appreciated property by dividend or redemption (Section 3 11),
liquidating distributions (Section 336) and sales of assets pursuant to a liquidation
(Section 337).
In 1982 Section 338 extended the General Utilities shield to a deemed bulk
sales of assets pursuant to a corporate purchase of control of target and election of
Section 338. Prior to 1969 liquidating and non-liquidating distributions were
treated essentially alike-nonrecognition with minor statutory and case-law
exception. From 1969 to 1984, the recognition exceptions to Section 311 were
gradually broadened.
B.

1986 Repeal of General Utilities

1. Introduction. Congress in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 repealed the
General Utilities' corporate-level shield in Section 336 governing liquidating
distributions, Section 311 governing nonliquidating distributions, and Section 338
stock acquisitions treated as asset acquisitions. Additionally, it repealed entirely
old Section 337 governing sales pursuant to a corporate liquidation and Section 333
governing nonrecognition at the shareholder level liquidations, while retaining in
new Section 337 the General Utilities shield with modifications for subsidiary into
parent liquidations under Section 332. The 1986 Act also limited recognition of
losses completely in Section 311 and partially in Section 336. To back-stop the
repeal of General Utilities Congress also imposed a 10-year taint of corporate level
recognition as to built-in appreciation at the time of conversion from a C
corporation to an S corporation for S corporation elections of existing C
corporations after December 31, 1986.
2. Small Business Transition Rule: Conference Statement.
The conference agreement provides an additional transitional rule for certain
closely held corporations. Corporations eligible for this rule are generally entitled
to present law treatment with respect to liquidating sales and distributions
occurring before January 1, 1989, provided the liquidation is completed before that
date. A liquidation will be treated as completed under the same standard that is
applied under the general transitional rules. However, this special transitional rule
requires the recognition of income on distributions of ordinary income property

(appreciated property that would not produce capital gain if disposed of a taxable
transaction) and short-term capital gain property. Thus, the failure of an eligible
closely held corporation to complete its liquidation by December 3 1, 1986, or
otherwise to satisfy the general transitional rules, will result in the loss of
nonrecognition treatment for the distribution of appreciated ordinary income and
short-term capital gain property. Corporations eligible for this rule may also make
an S election prior to January 1, 1989, without becoming subject to the special S
corporation rules [10-year taint, of new Section 1374 of the conference
agreement. Such eligible, electing corporation, however, will be subject to the
1954 Code version of Section 1374.
A corporation is eligible for this rule if its value does not exceed $10 million
and more than 50 percent of its stock is owned by 10 or fewer individuals who have
held their stock for five years or longer. Full relief is available under this rule only
if the corporation's value does not exceed $5 million; relief is phased out for
corporations with values between $5 million and $ 10 million. For purposes of this
rule, a corporation's value will be the higher of the value on August 1, 1986, and its
value as of the date of adoption of a plan of liquidation (or, in the case of a
nonliquidating distribution, the date of such distribution), and aggregation rules
similar to those in section 1563 apply, except that control is defined as 50 percent
rather than 80 percent.
In the case of nonliquidating distributions, apart from changes in the case of
ordinary income property and short-term capital gain property, present law is
otherwise retained for distributions to qualified, long-term individual shareholders
(but only during the transitional period) for corporations qualifying under the
closely held corporation transitional rule. H.R. Rep. No. 84 1, supra at 11-206 - II207 (emphasis added);

C.

1.

A similar 2 year transitional rule applies to Section 338. Id. S 63 l(d)(7).

2.

The statute itself actually omits the closely-held transition rule for
Section 311, See H. Cong. Res. 395 1(75), and 5-year holding
requirement, Id. 1[(74), 132 Cong. Rec. H8445, H8447 (Rep.
RostenkowskiY-

Effect of General Utilities Repeal on Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions
1. Introduction.

The central inquiry here is the effect of corporate level recognition upon a
sale of assets pursuant to liquidation, liquidating distribution, or deemed sale
pursuant to Section 338 of appreciation in the corporate assets upon the question of
cost or carryover basis acquisition. The discussion below assumes that the target is
a C corporation, i.e., corporate income is taxed at the corporate level rather than
as a flow through to shareholders as in an S corporation.
2. Closely-held target corporations.
a. General Utilities Repeal renders cost basis acquisition impractical.
In most cases the tax cost at the target level of recognition of all
appreciation in the target's assets upon a sale pursuant to liquidation or upon a
Section 338 election deemed sale outweighs the present value to the purchaser or

Neo-T of the tax benefits from a step-up in basis to fair market value. Exceptions
would arise where target has NOLs that shelter such step-up or target's recognition
will be at lower brackets than the acquiring company's tax rates which the
increased deductions from a cost basis acquisition would offset. Thus, as a
practical matter purchasing corporation will give up cost basis acquisition
treatment. See Thompson, 5 Va. Tax Rev. at 700.
b. Lack of carryover basis asset acquisition option.
The acquiring corporation ("P") generally prefers an asset acquisition. The
primary reason under old law was both to pass the incidence of the recapture tax
back to the target shareholders and to avoid hidden liabilities. As shown above, the
target shareholders now generally would not agree to a cost basis asset acquisition
since the incidence of double taxation would be too heavy. They would instead
agree under the new Code to a carryover basis stock acquisition or, if it were
possible, a carryover basis asset acquisition for a somewhat lessened sales price
than in a cost basis acquisition, i.e., fair market value, but not as great a reduction
as the inside full target level recognition tax. Therefore, the principal reason for a
asset acquisition by P would be to avoid hidden liabilities. However, a carryover
basis asset acquisition is permitted under current law only in the context of a
qualified reorganization which requires various amounts of the P consideration to
consist of stock in P. A purchase carryover basis asset acquisition is not
permitted. The consequence of the repeal of General Utilities without the
enactment of the elective carryover basis asset acquisition rules of the subchapter
C revision means as a practical matter that P must purchase target stock and not
elect Section 338 in order to avoid triggering target level recapture tax. Yet, when
cast in this manner target hidden liabilities remain with target. The classic means
for P to safeguard against hidden liabilities is to require warranties from the target
shareholders- and perhaps escrowing their stock. Neither is as effective as an asset
acquisition.
i. Use of warranties or escrow can also produce complex tax
consequences at the T shareholder level.
The T shareholders' preferred bargaining stance is to
sell their T stock to P without warranties concerning T
contingent liabilities. But if, as is likely to be the case,
warranties would be required, they may prefer a T § 337
asset sale and S 331 liquidation due to the adverse tax
treatment of any payment in a subsequent tax year (year 2)
pursuant to the warranty. If Installment Reporting is not
involved and the payment is made in year 2 either pursuant
to the warranty (or as transferee of liquidated T if a § 337
"liquidating trust" for contingent claims is not utilized), the
former T shareholder payments give rise to a capital loss
(which may be of limited practical value if they have no
capital gains in that or soon succeeding taxable years)
under Arrowsmith v. Commissioner supra. If Installment
Reporting is involved, then the former T shareholder
payment pursuant to warranty in a § 338 stock sale or as
transferee in a § 337 asset sale and § 33 1 liquidation
probably should be pro rated reducing future P payments
under contingent payment provisions of the § 453
temporary regs. See Ill.D.4.c.iii.b. and f., supra. If,
however, in a § 337 asset sale, Tsets up a "liquidating"
trust or partnership with assets to meet reasonable

contingent claims, the T shareholder will report only the
net result from the trust, presumably in year 2. See
authorities cited in III.B.2.c.i.a., supra. Still another
discontinuity thus arises since such an approach is not
possible with § 338. Lee, Taxable Corporate Acquisitions:
A Transactional Analysis of Section 338, 9th Ala. Tax Inst.
3.1, 3.85 (1985).
ii. Does an Asset Acquisition Shed Unwanted Liabilities? Whether P
actually can avoid hidden target liabilities by acquiring target assets is not
clear. The emerging direction of corporate law, at least where a business line
is acquired, whether in a C reorganization or by purchase at least as to
product liability liabilities, is to treat such acquisition as a de facto merger
with transferee liability to P as to the products liability exposure. See
Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 906 (1983).
D.

Indirect Effect of Repeal on Section 1060.

Clearly the thrust of Section 1060 (in the Senate) was to attain parity
between Section 337 and 338 as to allocation of basis and gain in cost basis
corporate acquisition. Now Section 337 has been repealed and Section 337 will be
little used. After the 2-year transition period for closely-held "small" corporations
is over, most corporate acquisiton will be carryover basis. How appropriate-a
hasty, cobbled-together, down-and-dirty solution for a large non-problem. Its
biggest impact probably will lie in the partnership arena. Still another reason not
to elect Section 754. What should be provided is mandatory ordinary income
treatment for going-concern value as to the seller and amortization over 60-months
by the buyer.

Attachment "A"
Excerpt from Rogers
Purchase Price Allocations
in Taxable Acquisitions, New
Frontiers - New Hazards,

62 Taxes 813 (1984)

Stock Purchases and the
Section 338 Election
If the buyer is not successful in obtaining
an asset purchase, Section 338 is currently available to the buyer to achieve results similar to
an asset purchase. The use of Section 338, however, shifts the recapture tax liability from the
seller to the buyer. While it is not the purpose
of this article to relate an exhaustive analysis of
Section 338, the mechanics of a Sectioa 338 election are integral to a discussion of valuation of
acquired assets.2'
Section 338 was enacted by Section 224(a)
of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982 30 to remove perceived abuses by companies purchasing the stock of another company
and desiring a "step-up" in the basis of the
underlying assets. The primary abuses TEFRA
sought to eliminate related to the ability under
Section 334(b)(2) to offset recapture taxes with
either the acquiror's or the acquired company's
net operating loss cr investment credit carryovers. Also, partial liquidations under Section
346 were being utilized to elimira.e investment
credit recapture and defer depreciation recapture
in certain types of acquisitions."1 TEFRA repealed Section 334(b)(2) " and Section 346 32 to
curb these abuses and substituted Section 338.
Section 338 is generally elective and the
technical requirements are very strict. A purchasing corporations" must make a qualified stock
purchase 33 of at least 80 percent of the total

combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the
total number of shares of all other classes of
stock (other than nonvoting preferred stock)
within a 12-month period.
Special rules under Section 338(h)(3)(B)
generally cause all 80 percent owned subsidiaries
of the target corporation to be included in the
Section 338 election. In addition, although no
election is made, a deemed election may occur
under operation of Section 338(e) where th

purchasing corporation acquires certain assets of
the target during a consistency period of about
two years surrounding the election. The deemed
election is intended to3 prevent the elective stepup in the basis of assets of the target company.
Docembor, 1984,

The Section 338 election is irrevocable and
must be made within nine and one-half months
after the date of acquisition.S Ifthe election is
made or is deemed made, the target is deemed to
have sold all of its assets under Section 337 on
the date of acquisition." The 1984 Act amended
original Section 338 to provide that the deemed
sale price for the underlying assets is the fair
market value of the assetsAs Further, Section
338(h) (11) now specifies that "fair market value
shall be determined on the basis of a formula
provided in regulations by the Secrctary which
takes into account liabilities and other relevant
items." The temporary regulations which have
been issued to date do not address the area of
determination of fair market value or a number
of other substantive areas. In fact, an election
under Section 338 is not due until 60 days after
publication of Reg. § 1.338-4T (yet to be published)."'
Gain on the deemed sale is tested under Section 337 to determine recognition." Thus, items
.,bject to recapture under Section 337 would result in taxable gain to the target. The tax year
of the target ends on the date of acquisition,
and any tax generated due to the application of
Section 337 is due on that final return. If the
targpt s included in the seller's consolidated return, then a separate return is filed including only
recapture items.'" It is now clear that the tax
liability on recapture items cannot be offset by
either the buyer's or seller's tax attributes or
carryovers and that the buyer is ultimately responsible for payment of the recapture taxes. The
buyer does, however, receive additional basis in
the acquired assets for the recapture taxes paid."2
Since the purchaser must pay the relevant
recapture taxes, the determination of items and
related amounts of recapture tax is extremely
-

McRickard. note 20. supra.
For excellent discussions of Section 338, see Gins-

burg, "Taxing Corporate Acquisition.s,"

38 Tax Law

Reriez 171 (1983); Amdur, "Federal Income Tax Treatment of the Parties to a Taxable Stock Acquisition: The
Impact of TEFR.A." 41 Intitue on Federal Taxation Sec.
51A.01 (1983); New York State Bar Association, Tax
Section, "R.eport of the Committee on Corpora.ions on
Section 338," 37 Tax Lawyer 155 (1983).
" P. L 97-248 (September 3. 1982) (hereina.fter cited
as TEFRA).
See e g., Ginsburg, note 29, supra, at 218.
"TEFRA Section 224(b).
- Id. at Section 222(d).
Section 338(a).
' Section 338(d)(3).
" Section 338(g), amended by the Tax Reform Act
of 1984, Section 712(k)(4) 0herehladter cited as TRA

of 1984).

" Section 338(a)(1).
"TRA of 1984, Section 712(k)(1)(A).
'Temp. Reg. § 1.338-4T, T. D. 7975 (August 14,
1984), redesignating Temp. Reg, § 5L33&-l(h)(1), T. D.
7942 (February 7,1984).
'Section 338(a) (1).
"Temp. Reg. j 1.33&-IT(f)(3), T. D. 7975 (August
14, 1984), redesignating Temp. Reg. §5i438-l(f)(3),
T. D. 7942 (February 7,1984).
"See S.Rep. No.1622, 97th Cong., 2d Ses..
193 (1982).
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important. As mentioned previously, the gain on

the Section 338 election is tested under Section
337 for recognition. The following items are subject to potential recapture because of the deemed
Section 337 treatment:
1. Recapture of depreciation on personal
property under Section 1245.
2. Recapture of depreciation on real
property under Section 1250.
3. Recapture of investment tax credit
under Section 47.
4. Recapture of LIFO inventories under
Section 337(f).
5. Recognition of deferred gain on installment obligations under Section 453B.
4
6. Recognition of deferred DISC income. 1
7. Recogpition of income from controlled
foreign subsidiaries under Section 1248.
8. Tax ibeiefit items subject to inclusion
in income for items previously deducted.
The basis calculation under Section 338 is at

least a two-step process. The first step applies
the fair market value of all assets against their

respective tax bases to determine the tax on
recapture items. The second step then allocates
the adjusted purchase price (including recapture
taxes) over the assets purchased based upon respective fair market values. The purchase price
is adjusted by unsecured liabilities assumed and
recapture taxes paid. An additional adjustment
to the purchase price is required if less than 100
percent of the target is acquired."

The methods of determining fair market
values of specific tangible and intangible assets
will be discussed in the remainder of this article
as they apply to both Section 338 acquisitions and
direct asset purchases. At this time it is appropriate to review the basis determination mechanics
of the Section 338 election with a simple example.
Facts: P acquires 100 percent of T on December 1, 1984, for $1,600,000 and makes a Section
338 election. Sections 1245 and 1250 recapture
equals $80,000; LIFO recapture equals $40,000;
DISC recapture equals $30,000 (total tax related
to those items - $150,000 X 50%,5 or $75,000) ;
and investment credit recapture equals $25,000.
T's balance sheet on December 1, 1984, is as
follows:

Asset
Cash
..
......
Receivables (net) .......
Inventories (LIFO) ..........
Investments (including DISC)

..

Fixed assets (net of depreciation of $110,C 00)
Other assets ...............
... . . ....
Goodw ill . ..........................
Going concern value .................
Total assets ..

.......

....

Tax
Bass
$ 20,000
100,000
150,000
70,000

FairMarket Value

$ 20,000

90,000
0
0

100,000
225,000
100,000
700,000
90,000
0
400,00

$870,000

$1,635,000

440,000

Liabilities
$180,000

Accotnts payable and accrued expenses.
Current taxes payable
...
Deferred taxes
.
Stockholders' equity

20,000
40,000
630,000

Total liabilities and stockholders' equity
"The target corporation must include in its gross
income, as a dividend, the excess of the fair market value
of the DISC stock over its adjusted basis to the extent
of the (deferred and untaxed) accumulated DISC income
attributable to the stock held by the liquidating parent
under Section 995(c)(2). See also Rev. Rul. 79-104, 1979-I
CB 263. This rather harsh treatment contrasts drastically with pre-1976 law, which allowed a target corporaion owning a DISC to sell its DISC stock under
Section 337 without recognizing the dividend income, so
long as the purchaser corporation continued to operate
the DISC. See S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. 299.
Under the TRA of 1994, DISCs which are qualified on
December 31, 1984 will treat all accumulated DISC
inc.e derived by a DISC prior to January 1, 1985 as
previously taxed income. TRA of 1984, Sec. 805(b)
(2)(A). In addition, no recapture will erist on transfers

$870,000

of FSC stock after 1984. Therefore, this recapture item
is no longer cf consequence for acquisitions after January
1, 1985.
"Section 338(c)(1) limits the nonrecognition provisions of Section 337 to the highest percentage of stock
owned during the one-year period beginning on the
acquisition date, unless the target is liquidated during
that period. Thus, a tax liability could result in addition
to recapture items due to the acquisition of less than
10G percent of the target's stock. For ease of illustration,
it will be assumed throughout the remainder of this
article that the purchaser acquires 100 percent of the target.
"This rate is assumed to include the related state
income taxes.
"No additional basis is available for deferred income
taxes, as the liability exists only for financial accounting
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December, 19841

The adjusted purchase price would be determined as follows:
P's cost of T's stock
Unsecured liabilities
Investment tax credit recapture
Tax on other rccapture items

$1,300,000
200,000
25,000

Total consideration paid
Less:
Cash 4.

$1,600,000

Receivables 47

....

75,000

20,000
100,000

. ...

Basis to be allocated

$1,480,000

The basis would be allocated as follows:
FairMarket
Value
Inventories

........

. ....

Investment- (DISC)
Fixed assets
Other assets

....

.

Goodwill

Percentage

14.9
6.6
46.2
5.9

$ 225,000
100,000
700,000
90,000
0

Going concern value ..

Allocated
Value
$ 221,000
98,000
684.000
87,000

26.4

400,000

$1,515,000

390,000
$1,480,000

The balance sheet before and after the election would then appear as follows:
Assets
Before Election

Cash ....................................
Receivables .............................
Inventories ...........................
Investment ..........................
Fixed assets .....
...............
Other assets ... ..... .........
Goodwill ...........................
Going concern value .......
Total assets

..

...

. ...
.

.............

After Election

$ 20,000
100,000
150,000
70,000
440,000
90,000
0
00..

$

$870,000

$1,600,000

$180,000
20,000
40,000
630,000

$ 1,?,CC-0

$870,000

$1,600,000

20,000
100,000
221,000
98,000
684,000
87,000
0
390,000

Liabilities
Accounts payable and accn ied exp ense.
Current taxes payable
Deferred taxes
...
Stockholders' equity
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity.

The holding period of all the .assets of the target8
starts on the date after the acquisition date.4
The target corporation is deemed to be a new corporation for tax purposes and is therefore free
to make new elections as to accounting methods,
determination of amortization periods, choice of
ACRS lives, etc.

December, 198A

123,000

0
1,300,000

purposes and is in effect replaced by the actual recapture
tax paid. Historical deferred taxes disappear under
"purchase" accounting, as described in Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16, "Business Combinations."
" Cash and cash equivalents, including receivables,
have been excluded under the rationale of Boise Ca.scade
Corp. v. Commissioner, 68-2 usTc 119509, 288 F. Supp. 770
(DC Ida.) and R. M. Smith, Inc., CCH Dec. 34,763, 69
TC 317 (1977).
' Section 338(a) (2).
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Other Valuation Considerations
It is now an accepted fact of lild that goodwill and going concern value should be considered
and valued in every acquisition situation. Unless
reasonable values are assigned to goodwill and
going concern value, the ability to maintain allocations of value and subsequent amortization
deductions is significantly jeopardized. Therefore, a discussion of the background oi each concept and method available for valuation of
goodwill and going concern value is critical for an
understanding of the remainder of a discussion
of other valuation coni deration,,.
Goodwill.-- Goodwill" is a concept that
arises in several areas of business, including
tax law and financial accounting.v It is a term
that has been used so often and in so many
different contexts that'it eludes an easy definition.
Before launching into a discussion of goodwill as
it relates to the tax law, it may be helpful to first
explore its meaning when used for accounting
purposes in business acquisitions.
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No.
16, "Business Combinations," requires that the
acquisition of a business be accounted for either
as a pooling of interests or as a p irchase.50 Basically, a pooling of interests occurs w,'hen one corporation acquires another through an exchange
of the stock of the purchaser for the stock of the
target. Since the ownership of the stock of the
target remains continuous (i. e., the shareholders
of the target still have an interest in it through
ownership of the stock of the merged corporation), the assets and liabilities of the target corporation are carried at book value on the books
of the buyer corporation. The theory behind
pooling of interests treatment is that 1±z transaction is not a realization event since the owners
have merely changed the form of their investment
without severing their ties to it. This concept is
similar to the treatment of a tax-free reorganization.
In contrast, other business combinations are
considered to take the form of "purchases." These
are transactions in which a significant portion of
the equity interests in the target corporation have
been eliminated, as happens when a target is
taken over by use of a cash tender offer or by use
of debt securities which do not have equity char.acteristics and do not count toward continuity of
interest. Since the ownership interests in the
target corporation change, a realization event has
occurred and the assets and liabilities of the
target should be recorded at their fair market
values. In many instances, the purchase price
paid for the target will exceed the fair market
values of the identifiable net assets. The excess
represents "goodwill" for accounting purposes,
and APB Opinion .o 17 requires that this goodwill be amortized ov'er a period of not greater
than 40 years. Goodwill will arise in the financial
accounting sense, therefore, when an acquisition
is accounted for as a purchase. Goodwill for
financial purposes is defined in a mechanical

way as simply being the excess of purchase price
over the fair market value of identifiable assets.
In contrast to the financial accounting treatment of goodwill, tax law prohibits amortization
since it is not considered to have a determinate
useful life.," Goodwill is a relatively old concept
in the tax law, and one that has been the subject
of much litigation. Definitions of goodwill have
varied from case to case, but one frequently cited
definition is "the sum total of those imponderable
qualities which attract the customers of a business . . . the essence of goodwill is the expectancy of "continued patronage, for whatever
reason." 5
The earlier cases in the development of the
goodwill concept seemed to consider it as a
catchall, or residual, of costs which could not be
separately identified in a taxable acquisition. 3
Later cases, however, have spoken of goodwill
iii terms of excess or extraordinary earning
power. For example, one court defined goodwill
as "the expectation of continuing excess earning
capacity and some competitive advantage or
continued patronage." - Goodwill had evolved
to the point where it connoted extraordinary or
unusual earning power. This evolution left something of a vacuum in the law which was filled by
the judicial concept of "going concern value" in
the 1960's and 1970's. Going concern value is an
intangible asset which represents the ability of
the business to generate income without interruption despite a change in ownership. Thus,
goodwill has come to be identified with unusual
earning power (compared with other businesses
in that industry) while going concern value reflects the ability of the business to generate
normal profits despite a change in ownership. 55
Where excess earning power rs shown to be
associated with the personal attributes of an individual who is no longer with the enterprise
after transfer, courts have held that no goodwill
was transferred.56 Similarly, where price corn.
petition is intense, goodwill may arguably not
exist since recurring customer contacts result
"See

generally

Donaldson, "Goodwill

and Other

Intangibles in Business Acquisitions," 31st Inrtitute on
Federal Taxation 291 (1973).
A. P. 13. Opinions Nos. 16 and 17, "Business Cornbinations" and "Intangible Assets," effective November

1, 1970.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3.

Boe v. Commi.ssioner, 62-2 usTc ff 9699, 307 F. Zd 339,
342 (CA-9), aff'g CCH Dec. 24,641, 35 TC 720 (1961).
Another frequently appearing description of goodwill is
the "expectancy that 'old customers resort to the old
place' of business." Metallicz Recycii:g Co., CCH Dec.
39,469. 79 TC 730, 742 (1982) and cases cited therein"See e. g., ThriftiCheck Service Corporation v. Coinmissioner, 61,1 us're f 9260, 287 F. 2d I (CA-2).

" Fedders Corporation,CCH Dec. 36,235(M), 39 TCM

1 (1979), rev'd on different grounds, sub norr Borg[Varner Corporation z'. Commis.ioner, 1-2 usrc 1 9684, 660

F. 2d 324 (CA-7).
' See VGS Corporation, CCH Dec. 34,519, 68 TC 563,
591 (1977).
"See Fedders Corporatiotn, note 54, supra.
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from price and not from any special attributes
of the business."
While many courts have struggled with the
definition of goodwill, measuring it has proven
to be even more difficult. The three basic approaches courts have used are the residual method,8
the contract method, and the formula method.
The residual method is similar to the means of
computing goodwill under generally accepted accounting principles (the purchase method). That
is, goodwill is the difference between the purchase price of the business and the fair market
values of the identifiable assets.
Under the contract method, the buyer and
seller agree between themselves as to the value
to be placed on goodwill. Assuming that the
parties are "adverse" in the tax sense (i. e., that
the seller would be better off with capital gain
treatment and the buyer would be better off with
an amortizable asset) the IRS and the courts
will generally not upset their allocation.
The formula method was first -;et forth by the
IRS in A. R. M. 34, and is also known as the
"A. R. M. 34 method."" 9 This method was updated and approved by the IRS only for use in
situations where there is no better basis for
measuring goodwill.D The formula approach
attempts to capitalize the excess earning power of
the business. The formula approach is rather
complex but, in essence, a percentage return on
the average annual- value of the tangible assets
used in a business is determined using a period
of at least five years immediately prior to the
valuation date. The amount of the peicentage return on tangible assets thus determined is deducted from the average earnings of the business
for the period. The remainder is considered to be
the amount of the average annual earnings from
the intangible assets for the period. This amount,
when capitalized, is the value of the unidentified
intangibles under the formula approach. The
ruling recommends a 15 percent rate of capitalization for business with low risk and a rate of
20 percent for businesses with a higher risk of
failure. Likewise, the percentage rate of return
on tangible assets used in a low-risk business is
set at 8 percent, and at 10 percent for a high-risk
business.
All three methods of valuing goodwill have
been applied by the courts, although the residual
method seems to appear mo'st frequently, perhaps
because of its simplicity. 6
Going Co icern Va~ar- -The concept of going
concern VaTue oftgin ted in regulated industries
rate cases in the 19,0's. 12

The concept gained

vitality in the 1970's in a series of purchase price
allocation cases when the IRS argued that the
purchasers acquired going concern value in those
cases where goodwill was not found to exist."
The accepted definition of going concern
value in most of the cases is "in essence, the additional element of value which attaches to property by reason of its existence as an integral part
of a going concern."
December, 1984
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One frequently cited case

involving going concern value is VGS Corporation
v. Commis.ioner." VGS was a corporation whose

predecessor acquired all the stock of a corporation
and certain assets of a partnership which were
operated together as a going concern. The acquired corporation was subsequently liquidated
under Section 332, with basis determined under
Section 334(b)(2). The parties relied on an appraisal report to allocate the purchase price over
the assets acquired but did not allocate any value

to intangibles, such as goodwill or going concern
value.
The court found that no goodwill was transferred, since the existence of goodwill would require that the "purchaser could expect not only
conitinued excess earning capacity, but also some
competitive advantage or continued patronage." "'
Application of the capitalized net earnings
method demonstrated that there was no excess
earning capacity in the business. However, the
court did find that going concern value existed
because the "operations were able to survive and
make a profit in a highly competitive industry
during a time when many small refineries were
unable to break even . . . . The business acquired . . . was more than a mere collection of
assets. It was rather a viable, functioning, and
going concern capable of generating a profit, and
(the buyer) acquired a valuable property as a
result." " The court measured the going concern
value by using a combination of the taxpayer's
and the IRS's appraisal reports. As a result,
costs allocated to each asset group in the taxpayer's original appraisal were adjusted to reflect
the going concern value of each such asset group.
The depreciable bases of the tangible assets were
reduced, and an intangible asset was correspondingly established. Since going concern value has
an indeterminate useful life, it (like goodwill)
was not subject to the allowance for amortization.
VGS illustrates a number of issues important in the going concern area. For example, the
court in VGS clearly differentiated between goodwill and going concern value. Some courts, however, have found it sufficient merely to decide
that goodwill or going concern value exist. Having made that determination, these courts have
not ta-ken the further step of allucating between
the two since the result is the same regardless of
' See VGS Corporation, note 55, supra.
For discussions on valuation of goodwill, see
Donaldson, note 49, supra, at 296; 4-Mertens Section
59.29 and foilowing (Callaghan & Company, 1976).
S2 C3 31 (1920).
Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 CB 327.
' See e. g., Jack Daniel Distillery "v.
U. S., note 21.
supra.
" See Los A,:geles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad
Commission, 289 U. S. 287 (1933).
" See e. g.,. VGS Corporation, note 55. supra; ComPating & Software, Inc., CCH Dec. 33,721, 64 TC 223
(1975).
VGS Corporation, note 55, supra, at 591.
Note 55, supra
- Id. at 590.
Id. at 592.
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how the intangibles are designated."
cases have clearly analyzed going concern value
and goodwill as distinct assets and have recognized that they may exist independently of each
other." Therefore, in planning an acquisition,
both assets should be considered separately.
The proper method of determining the value of
going concern is obviously the most important issue.
The court in VGS applied a combination of appraisals to arrive at going concern value. In contrast, the
Tax Court in Black Industries, Inc. applied the
residual method to determine going concern
value.tO In Black Industties, the court first ascertained the fair market values of the tangible assets acquired by using appraisals. Finally, the
court subtracted this sum of fair market values
from the total purchase price to arrive at going
concern value using the residual method. In
contrast, the court in Concord Control, Inc. v. Commissionerl' applied the capitalization method to
determine going concern value. The court rejected use of the residual method because it was
not confident in the appraised values of the tangible assets. The capitalization method was thus
found to produce the most accurate and reasonable estimate of going concern value.
The above methods of valuation correspond
to the methods previously discussed with regard
to the valuation of goodwill. One method discussed in that regard is the "contract method,"
whereby the parties (buyer and seller) may
agree on the value attached to going concern
value. The taxpayer in such a case may argue
that the purchase agreement allocates going
concern value and is not subject to attack by the
IRS.T2 In Concord Control, Inc., for example, the
parties attempted to allocate $1 to all intangible
assets in their purchase contract. The court found
that the parties were not adverse in a tax sense
because the seller had no gain to recognize due
to net operating loss carryforwards. In Concord
Control, Inc., the contract method of valuation did
not apply since the court did not re5pc,' me allocations made by the parties.
Tax Benefit Rule.-One of the greatest
haiards in taxable acquisitions is the application
of the tax benefit rule. Although the tax benefit
rule is not a new concept, recent court decisions
have clarified its application. Where Section 338
is elected following a stock purchase, the acquirer
should be aware of the potential for application of
this rule as its effect could be very detrimental to
the economics of the acquisition. In the situation
of a purchase of assets, the effect of the application of the tax benefit rule rests with the seller.
A knowledgeable seller, however, will anticipate
the hazards of the tax benefit rule and therefore
will negotiate the sales contract with the potential cost of its application in mind. For example, if a buyer desires to allocate a specific
part of the purchase price to an asset created out
of research and development outlays, the seller
may demand compensation for the imposition of
ordinary rates instead of capital gain rates on
any gain.

The tax benefit rule has been judicially developed over the years with various refinements
and distinctions. Dobson v. Commissioner,r" in-

volved a taxpayer who sold stock at a loss, which
resulted in a deduction on the return for the year
in which the stock was sold. In a later year the
taxpayer recovered an amount from the settlement of a suit against the seller oi the stock. The
Court found the amounts recovered were not
taxable gain except to the extent that the loss
deduction of the prior year resultcd in a tax
benefit. Dobson stands for the proposition that
the tax benefit rule applies to an actual recovery
of losses taken in prior years.
Besides Dobson, there have been a number
of cases expanding or narrowing the application
of the tax benefit rule. In Commissioner Y. South
Lake Farm, Inc.,7 " the court held that farming
expenses incurred in the production of unharvested
crops which were deducted in one taxable year
were not includible in income the following year
when the farm corporation was liquidated under
Section 336. The court explained that Dobson
limited the tax benefit rule to actual recoveries.
Tae court concluded that it did not see any
theory on which it could be said that the liquidated
corporation had recovered the expenses of production that it deducted. Thus, there was no
amount to be included in income.
In Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v.
Commissioner,5 the Sixth Circuit rejected the
holdings in the above cases. In this case a subsidiary prior to its liquidation under Section 332
had fully expensed the value of its tires and tubes.
Under Section 334(b)(2) the parent claimed a
stepped-up basis in the tires and tubes acquired.
The court held that the parent was required to
include in income the value of the tires and tubes
distributed to it by its subsidiary. First, the court
held that the tax benefit rule is applicable to
corporate liquidations under Section 336. Second,
the court held that there was no need for an
actual physical "recovery" of some tangible asset
or sum in order to apply the tax benefit rule. The
court cited Block v. Commissioner1 for the proposition that the tax benefit rule should apply
whenever there is an actual recovery or an event
inconsistent with the prior deduction. The court
in Tennessee-Caroliva Transportation found the

liquidation of the subsidiary inconsistent with the
prior deduction.
'See e. g., Computing & Software, Inc., note 63,
supra; Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. U. S., 71-1 usTc
1"9488, 444 F. 2d 677 (CA-5).

"See e g., Solitron Devices, Inc., CCH Dec. 39,801,
80 TC 1 (1983).
"See note 18, supra.
" 80-1 usrc 9248, 615 F.2d 1153 (CA-6).
'See e.g.,
Concord Control, Inc. v. Commissioner, note
71, supra.
"44-1 usrc ff9108, 370 U. S.489 (1943).
" 64-1 usic ff9101, 324. F. 2d 837 (CA-9 1963).

"78-2 usrc ff9671, 582 F. 2d 378 (CA-6), cert. denied,
440 U. S.909 (1979).
"40-1 usic ff9273, 111 F. 2d 60, aff'g CCH Dec.
10,585, 39 BTA 338, cert. denied, 311 U. S. 658.
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The most recent cases a.ddressing the tax
benefit rule were the companion cases of Hillsboro
National Bank v. Commissioner and United States
v. Bliss Dairy, Inc.7 In Hillsboro the corporation
(a bank) made payments for state taxes imposed
on their shareholders and then deducted the
amounts paid. The state ultimately refunded the
amounts to the shareholders. The court found
that the payments made by the corporation were
not negated since there was no refund to the
corporation, and thus the refund to the shareholders did not require the corporation to recognize income under the tax benefit rule.
In Bliss Dairy, the court did apply the tax
benefit rule so that the taxpaye. (a farm corporation) was required to recognize income. In
Bliss Dairy the corporation deducted the full cost
of cattle feed purchased for use in its operations.
The following taxable year the corporation
liquidated pursuant to Internal Revenue Code
Section 336 and distributed its assets including
the cattle feed to its shareholders. Since Section
336 shields a corporation from recognizing gain
on the distribution of property to shareholders,
the corporation reported no income on the transaction. The shareholders presuma., Luow a basis
greater than zero in the feed.
The court recognized that a concern for a
more accurate measurement -of income underlies
the tax benefit rule. The court declined to follow
the "recovery" analysis of South Lake Farms and
other cases as the exclusive approach to the tax
benefit rule. In discussing the purpose of the tax
benefit rule, the court stated that the tax benefit
rule will "cancel out" the prior deduction only
if a later event is fundamentally inconsistent with
the assumptions on which the deduction was
based. In other words, if the event occurred in
the same taxable year, the deduction would not
have been allowed. In Bliss Dairy the court found
such a fundamentally inconsistent event. When
the deduction for the cost of .the cattle feed was
made, the corporation assumed it would be consumed within the taxable year; it was not. The
shareholders received it in the following year
and obtained a steppod-up basis.
Thus, only where an event occurs that would
have resulted in a disallowance of the deduction
had it occurred in the earlier year must the taxpayer recognize income when the event occurs in
a later year. The taxpayer's proper action is to
include the amount in the later year's income
rather than file an amended return. This is especially true if the statute of limitations has run
and the filing of an amended return is precluded.
Bliss Dairy significantly widens the application of the tax benefit rule. Justice Stevens in his

dissent stated that "[p]resumably all expenses
for the purchase of tangible supplies will be
treated like cattle feed. Thus, all corporate paper
towels, paper clips, and pencils that remain on
hand will become income as a result of the
liquidation." Is
December, 1984

Because Bliss Dairy involved a liquidation in
which gain was not recognized, the issue is raised
as to whether specific nonrecognition provisions
prevail over the tax benefit rule. Bliss Dairy involved the nonrecognition provisions of Section
336. The court concluded that Section 336 did
not prevent the application of the tax benefit rule.
The nonrecognition provisions of Section 336 are
not absolute. For example, Section 336 does not
bar Sections 1245 and 1250 recapture of excess
depreciation taken on distributed assets.1 O The

court, citing a number of cases, concluded that
the cou'rts have never read Section 336 as absolute.80
The court also likened Section 336 to Section
337 in stating that the very purpose of Section,
337 was to create the same consequences as
Section 336. The court then stated that "the
rule is now well established that the tax benefit
rule overrides the nonrecognition provisions" of
Section 337,1 Thus, as Section 336 is similar to
Section 337 and Section 337 is overridden by"the
tax benefit rule, then Section 336 is also overriddcn
by the tax benefit rule.
Based upon the Bliss Dairy_ decision, it seems
clear that the tax benefit rule could apply where
Section 338 is elected because of Section 338
reliance on the rules of Section 337 for guidance
as to taxability of. the target corporation.
Application of the Tax Benefit Ru.le.-The
tax benefit rule works to include in income the
amount previously deducted to the extent of the
value of the particular item. This means that if,
for example, $25 was previously deducted relative
to a particular asset which was worth $50 at the
time of acquisition or liquidation, the tax benefit rule
would apply only to the $25 previously deducted.32
Therefore, a determination as to both current
value and historical costs must be made in order
to assess the effect of the tax benefit rule. While
both determinations may be difficult, the determination of historical cost in many circumstances
can be especially troublesome, as many accounting systems do not provide for easy accumulation
of costs of specific items that are expensed. It is
likely, therefore, unless it can be shown to the
contrary that the previously expensed amount
was less than the value of the asset, triat the IRS
would take the position that the cost equalled
or exceeded the value assigned.
When the cost of an item that can be subsequently expensed or amortized is readily determinable and the value to be assigned exceeds that
cost significantly, an opportunity still exists for
a favorable purchase price allocation. The cost
of the tax benefit recapture must, of course, be
balanced against subsequent tax deductions from
the asset.
=83-1 us'rc 1 9229,- U. S.- , 103 S. CL 1134 (1983).
"Id., 103 S.Ct. at 1162.
"Sections 1245(b)(3), 1250(d)(3).
"See
note 78, supra, 103 S. Ct. at 1151.
T
Id. at 1153.
See CCH IRS LE-rER RULINGS RiPORTs No. 366,
Part II (Nov. 23. 1983), PLR 8409009.
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It is not known yet whether the IRS will

attempt to apply Justice Stevens's theory in his
Bliss Dairy dissent to all pencils, paper clips, etc.,
of an acquired company. Finally, the fact that
a purchaser does value items which are subject
to the tax benefit rule would not preclude the
IRS from asserting a value to be assigned and
thus causing additio'nal tax liabilit;es.

the inventory could be expected to be sold within
t'iree months. Further, T has experienced a 4
percent rate of obsolescence on an annual basis.
P's investment rate of return is assumed to be
12 percent. The value to be assigned would be
computed as follows:
Exp~ected sales price .
...
..
$800
Cost of disposition

..

(0)

Inventories.-Valuation of .nventories is a
significant factor in most acquired businesses. In
lines of business where the gross profit derived
from inventories is relatively high, an opportunity exists to assign a significant premium paid
over book value to inventories acquired.
Revenue Procedure 77-12 sets forth guidelines for making fair market value determinations
in asset purchase situations and where Section
338 is elected." The revenue procedure authorizes the use of an7 of the three basic m-ethods to
determine the fair market value of inventory:
(1) the cost of reproduction method, (2) the
comparative sales method, and (3) the income
method.
The cost of reproduction method is most
appropriate for use in valuing inventories in
wholesale and retail businesses, but should not
be used to establish the fair market value of the
finished goods of a manufacturing concern. This
method generally refers to replacement cost of
inventory items. The revenue procedure also
allows a value to be assigned based upon having
a well-balanced stock in place to serve customer
needs.
The comparative sales method utilizes the
actual or expected selling prices of finished goods
to customers as a basis of assigning fair market
values to those finished goods. The revenue
procedure specifies that certain costs should be
deducted from the exlected sales price, including
all costs of dispositior, which includes applicable
discounts, sales comr.iissions, and freight and
shipping charges. In addition, allowance should
be made for a reasonable profit margin on the
amount invested in the inventory. The reasonable profit margin should consider the length of
time required to dispose of the inventory and the
degree of risk associated with the business. Work
in process may also be valued using this method
by adding the costs of completion to the value
of the finished goods.
The income method is very similar to the
comparative sales method, although this method
focuses on providing a stream of income to provide for continuation of the acquired business.
Return on investment and costs of distribution
are also considered in applying this method.
To illustrate how the use of the comparative
sales method may be beneficial, assume that P
acquires the assets of T. Included in T's assets
are inventories which have a basis of $400 and a
retail value of $800. The disposition costs, including freight and sales commissions, are $80.
It is also determined that T's inventory turns
over an average four times a year, so, on average,

$720
Return on investment:
Investment rate .
Risk factor .
.

12%7
4%

16%

Annual return
Divided by turnover rates (4 times)

4
4%

Expected return X net value ($720
X 4%)...............
Fair market value
T's basis
Increase ...

(29)

......

$691
400

... .......

$291

The comparative sales method is very similar to
the method prescribed for acquisitions covered
by APB 16 for financial statement purposes.".
One strategy frequently employed in the use
of this method is to adopt the first in, first out
(FIFO) method of accounting for inventory valuation for the first taxable year after the acquisition
in order to recover benefit of the allocation."'
Adoption of the last in, first out method, if favorable, is then deferred until the second tax year
to avoid locking in the excess cost allocation to
inventory.
Valuation and Amortization of Intangible
Assets.-In order to sustain the valuation and
subsequent amortization of an intangible asset, it
is 'necessary to separate the value of that intangible" from goodwill and going concern value.
Regulation § 1.167(a)-3 describes the amortization of intangible assets. The basic requirements
in the regulations are that the asset must be of
use in the business for a limited period, and that
the period can be estimated with reasonable accuracy. Revenue Ruling 74-456 86 adds the requirements that the intangible asset must not be
a part of goodwill and, in addition, must have
a separate ascertainable value.
The IRS has, in a number of cases, resisted
attempts by the taxpayer to amortize intangible
assets by raising the "mass asset" theory.'
Un0 1977.1 CB 569. Although Rev. Proc. 77-12 specifies applicability only under Section 334(b)(2) situations, it would seem to be equally applicable to Section 338.
" See note 50, supra.

" This assumes that the inventory acquired turns
over in that period.
0 1974-2 CB 65.
'

See e. g., Wins-Dizie Montgomery, Inc. v. U. S., note

68, supra; ThriftiCzeck Serzice Corporation v. Commsissioner, note 53, supra.
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der this theory, intangible assets are valued as
an inseparable part of goodwill and therefore not
subject to amortization. The mass asset theory
has been described as the purchase of a "collection of inextricably intertwined, intangible assets
or rights whose values are so interrelated and
interdependent that they ar. not capable of
separate valuation other than in an unacceptable,
arbitrary manner. Further, each particular right
does not diminish with the passage of time. To
put it another way, the value of the mass of acquired assets does not lie in its individual components but in the whole indivisible bundle." 18
The IRS successfully applied the mass asset
theory in Boe v. Commissioner." In Boo, the taxpayer was one of four partners who purchased
a contract medical service organization, the major
asset consisting of several thousand medical
service contracts to provide services to subscribers.
Some of the purchase price was allocated in the
purchase contract to tangible assets, with the
bulk of the price being allocated to "goodwill
and other assets." The purchaser later attempted
to specifically allocate part of the purchase price
to the medical contracts and to deduct them as
they expired. This attempt was rejected by the
court.
In First N'orthwest Industries, Inc.,10 the taxpayer attempted to assign costs to player contracts acquired in connection with the purchase
of a professional basketball franchise, the Seattle
Supersonics. The IRS argued th, . c contracts
were part of a nonamortizable mass asset. In
so arguing, the IRS offered the following indicia
of a mass asset: "(1) The mass includes intangibles of indefinite duration which provide the
means to replace those individual intangibles that
are likely to expire, thus regenerating the value
of the mass as an entity; (2) the intantgibles of
indefinite duration are relatively more significant
in value than parts of the mass which may expire; and (3) the intangibles that do expire derive
their value, and have no value separate and
apart, from the assets of indefinite duration." "1
The key to a mass asset seems to be indefinite
useful life of the bulk of the intangibles and the
inability by the taxpayer to separate truly amortizable intangibles from the bulk of the intangibles
which have an indefinite useful life, such as goodwill.
The earlier cases analyzed intangibles under
the mass asset theo-y, with the bulk of intangible assets purchascd having an indeterminate
useful life." More recent cases have looked on
the mass asset theory as more of a default position in which the taxpayer has failed to sustain
its burden of proof that the intangibles have a
separate value and a determinable useful life.
One relatively recent case, Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. U. S.," reflects a more analytical
approach than the monolithic mass asset theory
espoused by the IRS.
In Houston Chronicle, the taxpayer was a
newspaper publisher who purchased the assets of
a rival newspaper, including various tangible
Docember, 1984

assets, a subscription list, and an agreement from
the seller not to publish a newspaper in the same
vicinity for a period of 10 years. The taxpayer
paid the seller a total of $4,500,000, none of which
was allocated to the various assets in the purchase
agreement. The taxpayer engaged in a postacquisition valuation of the assets purchased,
including the subscription lists. The lists were
valued by approximating the circulation of the
defunct newspaper and by estimating the percentage of old subscribers who would be expected
to subscribe to the Houston Chronicle in order to
determine the anticipated number of new subecribers. The anticipated number of new subscribers
was extended by the average cost of obtaining a
new subscriber to arrive at a value for the lists.
Finally, the taxpayer did not consider the lists to
be self-regenerating since the buyer discontinued
publication of the seller's newspaper.
The lump-sum purchase price in Houston
Chronicle did not reflect a specific allocation of
costs to the various assets, including the subscription list. However, the court would not
acquiesce to the simplistic mass asset theory as
a reflex action to the absence of an allocation.
Rather, the court analyzed the situation in terms
of the burden of prbof required to overcome the
IRS's proposed deficiency.
The court noted that the taxpayer has the
burden of establishing its right to claim a depreciation deduction under Section 167(a). In cases
where the taxpayer has failed to carry his burden, it was because of a failure of proof, rather
than a finding that the asset involved is nonamortizable per se. The court held that Houton
Chronicle sustained its burden of proof because of
the following items offered as evidence of valuation and useful life:
(1) Testimony from taxpayer's officers
and employees, based upon their experience
as publishers of an afternoon newspaper in
the Houston area, regarding the cost of obtaining new subscriptions;
(2) Corroborative testimony from the
valuation engineers;
(3) Testimony from taxpayer's officers
and employees regarding the anticipated useful life of a subscription list used in connection with the publication of an afternoon
newspaper in the Houston area;
(4) Corroborative testimony from the
valuation engineers as to useful life; and
(5) The results of a survey of current
subscribers regarding the useful life of an
average subscription, and testimony connecting
"First Aarthwest Indwstries, Inc., CCH Dec. 35,384,
70 TC 817, 844 (1978), rev'd and rem'd on, different
grounds, 81-2 usrc 9529, 649 F. 2d 707 (CA-9).
"See note 52, supra.
"See note 88, supra.

" Id., 70 TC at 845.
"See note 87, supra.
"73-2 usrc If 9537, 481 F. 2d 1240 (CA-5).
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the survey with the acquired subscription
lists (i. e., testimony that conditions in the
afternoon newspaper mar:et in Houston had
not materially altered in the years in question)."
The above criteria would seem to be relevant to the establishment of value and useful
life of many intangible assets that can be separated from goodwill and going concern value.
The following discussion of specific intangible
assets is predicated upon, first, the establishment
of appropriate valuation of goodwill and going
concern and, second, the existence of evidence
such as in Houston Chronicle which could be used

to support determinations of value and useful life.
Core Deposit Premiums.-One intangible

which has received considerable attention recently
due to the number of acquisitions of financial institutions is core deposit value. Core deposit
value, in a nutshell, is the value to a financial
institution of the spread between rates paid on
customer deposits and the rate earned on loans
and other investments in which those deposits
are reinvested. For example, if an acquired institution has deposits of $100,000,000 on which
it pays an average of 8 percent and is able to
reinvest those deposits at an average rate of
12 percent, the 4 percent spread in rates is a
valuable asset acquired with the deposits.
In order to determine core deposit value in
an acquired institution, the various categories
of deposits are analyzed to determine the total
costs allocable to each category of account. For
example, passbook deposit costs are the interest
paid on the deposits and the cost to service the
accounts. After the total cost for all deposit accounts is calculated, an alternative fund investment rate is then determined based upon what
the acquiring bank would pay for similar deposits.
Based upon this difference, an amount may then
be computed to be allocated to core deposit
value.
Finally, it is necessary to determine useful
life in order to recover the value over some period.
The approach most frequently used is based upon
historical turnover of the acquired bank's customer
accounts. Thus, for example, if the acquired
bank averaged 10,000 customer deposit accounts
over a five-year perwd and also averaged 1,000
closed accounts per year over the same period,
the useful life of the deposit base could be determined to be 10 years. Care should be exercised
in this objective determination that the historical
data is representative of future account relationships. The effect of deregulation and increased
competition in the future may significantly increase the turnover of deposit accounts as well as
increase the cost of the acquired funds.
Two recent caseb are key to the core deposit
valuation area. In Midlantic National Bank," the
taxpayer purchased the right to solicit the customers of an insolvent bank. The court held that
no part of the amount paid was allocable to goodwill because Midlantic had no reasonable expec-

tation of attracting thL goodwill of customers of
the insolvent bank, as many customers suffered
loss due to embezzlement by the officers of the
insolvent bank. Further, none of the purchase
price was attributable to going concern value
since the insolvent bank was closed.
The court analogized the acquisition of the
seller bank's core deposits to the acquisition of
customer lists in Manhattan Company of Virginia,
nc.,'1 since the acquisition was one of the core
deposits unaccompanied by goodwill or going

concern value. The court determined that 90
percent of the acquisition price was attributable
to the core deposit premium and allowed amortization over 14 years on the factual finding that
between 10 and 15 percent of the accounts closed
each year. The remaining 10 percent of the cost
of the right to solicit accounts from the acquired
bank was nonamortizable since that amount
represented the longevity of larger accounts and
the indefinite nature of their lives.
The recently decided case of .'outhern Bancorporation,Inc. v. U. S.91 sheds further light on
the amortization of core deposit premium. Southern
Bancorporation (SBC) acquired assets of a failing
bank in a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
initiated merger. Although the excess purchage
price was not specifically allocated to particular

assets at the time of the merger, on its tax
return SBC allocated a large part of the excess
purchase price to the loan portfolio of the former
bank and a small portion to going concern value.
The excess purchase price was allocated to loans
based on credit risks and yields and resulted in a
$5 million increase in the face amount of the loan
portfolio. The premium was then amortized over
the remaining lives of the respective loans. The
District Court agreed with SBC's allocation.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision, determining that
there was no indication at the time of the acquisition that the loan portfolio was being sold for
an amount that would have been paid by a willing
buyer and seller in an arm's-length sale. The
court held that the purchase price premium
should be allocated to going concern value since
SBC would continue the operation of the acquired bank in the same location with its own
branch. Importantly, however, the court, in a
footnote, discussed the possibility of establishing
an amortizable deposit base and cited Midlantic9
Although SBC did raise the issue in its complaint, it did not pursue a deposit base allocation
during the trial and the court did not make such
allocation.
In response to Midlantic, the IRS announced

in a 1984 Action on Decision '1 that it would acId. 481 F. 2d at 1253.
"CCH Dee. 40,477(M), 46 TCM 1464 (1983).
"CCH Dec. 28,918, 50 TC 78 (1968).
9396, 732 F. Zd 374 (CA-4).
"84-1 usrc 1"
Id., 732 F. 2d at 376 n. 2.
"AOD CC-1984-019.
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quiesce in the Midlantic decision for acquisitions
of failing banks, but will strongly oppose any
attempt to create an amortizable useful life for
the costs incurred to acquire a pre-existing deposit base of a going concern bank which has
been acquired. Banks should expect a challenge
to any deduction resulting from tht amortization
of costs allocated to the acquisition of a preexisting deposit base of an ongoing bank, as a
result of taxable asset acquisitions or Section 338
elections.
Based upon these decisions and in spite of
IRS opposition, it appears that core deposit value
is a viable intangible asset that should be considered in acquisition of financial institutions.
Although the above cases dealt only with failed
banks, the same principles should apply to acquisitidn of "healthy" institutions if proper determinations of goodwill and going concern value
are made.
Covenants Not to Compete.-Due to the tax
consequences, a strong dichotomy of interests
between buyers and sellers has developed over
the years concerning the allocation of costs between goodwill and covenants not to compete.
The seller is interested in having as much of the
purchase price as possible allocated to goodwill,
as opposed to a covenant not to compete, so that
the sale proceeds may qualify for capital gain
treatment. If the purchase price i3 allocated to
the covenant, the payments recei ed by the seller
are treated as ordinary income. The buyer is
interested in the converse, namely, having as
much as possible allocated to the covenant so
that he may amortize the cost of the covenant
over its lifetime. If the purchase price is allocated to goodwill, an asset with an indeterminable life, the buyer will not be afforded an amortization deduction.
Courts generally will not allow the parties
to an agreement to disturb the express allocations
to goodwill and covenants not t. csa,,pete, as
previously discussed. Where a written agreement makes no allocation of the lump-sum purchase price to a covenant not to compete, the
courts, in rare instances, have allowed the purchaser to successfully challenge the allocation,
thus entitling him to amortize the covenant during
its lifetime. In order for the buyer to prevail in
such a dispute, the Tax Court has held that he
must be able to show: "(1) that the covenant had
independent economic significance such that we
might conclude that it was a bargained-for element of the agreement; and (2) that the parties
considered the covenant as a valuable part of the
entire consideration of the agreement." 100

In

Illinois Cereal Mills, the buyer was able to meet
this difficult burden of proof. In that case, the
purchase agreement expressly provided for a
covenant not to compete but did not make any
allocation of the purchase price for that or any
other asset. The court stated that it was clear
that the covenant had significant independent
economic value becizse, absent the covenant,
there was nothing to prevent the seller from reDeceamber, 1984

entering the same market in the future if economic changes suggested increased profitability.
As to the second requirement, the court stated
that, based on the parties' own testimony as well
as their actions, both the buyer and the seller
considered the covenant a valuable part of the
total consideration. Hence, the court found that
20 percent of the total purchase price was properly allocable to the covenant not to compete,
that amount being subject to amortization deductions over the five-year life of the covenant.
Finally, it is clear that where no covenant
was bargained for in a purchase agreement (absent facts similar to Illinois Cereal Mills), the
courts will not sustain allocation of value to
covenants not to compete. 0 1
Favorable Leases and Contracts.-The existence of favorable leases in a target company
which are assumable by the purchaser can offer
significant opportunities for assignment of value.
The fair market value of a particular lease may
be determined by reference to similar leases for
the same or similar property. This valuation
t'.chnique may be especially valuable for leases
of real estate and office space and in some cases
equipment such as aircraft that have appreciated
in value since the lease originated. The excess
value determined by the difference between current lease rates for the same property and the
contractual lease rates can be assigned a value.
Since the lease has a definable value and the life
is known, this value may be amortized over the
life of the underlying lease.' 0 '
The Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit in
Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp. v. Commissioner " approved a. method for valuation of
acquired leases. Miami Valley bought all the
stock in a television station and thereafter liquidated it. As part of the liquidation, Miami Valley
received a lease with a 14-year remaining term.
Although its only use was as a television facility,
the lease was considered a premium lease, as the
rental payments were only $26,200 per year,
whereas the annual fair market value rent for the
building and its underlying land was $94,200. The
difference between the actual rent to be paid over
the remaining 14-year term of the lease and the
fair market rental for the same period was
$957,667. In view of this differential and the
absence of any actual market for the lease, the
Tax Court determined that the proper method
for valuation of the leasehold was the income
approach.
Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc., CCH Dec. 40,342(M), 46
TCM 1001 (1983).
m

' See Theoplit v. U. S., 83-2 Lsc fr9630, 571 F.

Supp. 516 (DC Mich.) (deduction for amortization of
a covenant not to compete disallowed where no value

assigned to covenant at the time of the acquisition).
'"See e. g., Washington Package Store, Inc., CCH
Dec. 27,041(M), 23 TCM 1805 (1964).
, 81-2 usrc 19747, 661 F. 2d 582 (CA-6), rev'g and

rem'g CCH Dec. 36,508(M), 39 TCM 760 (1979) (Sixth
Circuit agreed with method of valuation of Tax Court,
but remanded for redetermination based on higher interest rate).
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The court explained that under that approach it is necessary to ascertain or estimate
the present value of the anticipated savings in
rent over the following 14-year period of ownership of the lease. To compute the present value
of the excess of the economic rent over the contract rent, an apprcpriate discount factor must be
applied to the future income (the anticipated
savings in rent in this case). The discount factor
must reflect the hazards of the investment such
as the inherent risks that business or economic
conditions may change over the period of the
lease, the practical problems of marketing the
lease or otherwise liquidating the anticipated
savings at any given times, and the burdens and
limitations imposed by the terms of the lease.
The Tax Court calculated a present value of
the anticipated savings in rent over the following
14-year period of $350,000 by using a discount
rate of 172 percent, which was composed of a
12Y2 percent interest rate plus 5 percent for investment risks. On appeal, the U. S. Court of
Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed and remanded
the case to the Tax Court with instructions that
the Tax Court conclude the matter by determin-

ing the value of the leasehold in question using a
discount rate of 11 percent. The Court of Appeals

arrived at this 11 percent figure by taking the
prevailing interest rate at the time the present
value of the leasehold in question was to be determined (6 percent in 1964) and adding to it an
additional 5 percent to reflect the investment
risks determined by the Tax Court.
It would seem that similar methods may be
used to value favorable contracts for either the

purchase or sale of goods, again assuming the
purchaser is able to assume the target's rights
under the contracts. For example, the target may
have long-term supply contracts for raw materiaIs
that are negotiated at a time where raw material prices were lower than current prices. The
additional value of the contract based upon increased raw material prices could be amortized
over the remaining life of the contract.
Liabilities.-To the extent liabilities are assumed that have rates or terms that are below
current market rates, a positive value may be
assigned to this "asset." This frequently occurs
where the target has incurred long-term debt at
rates below current market rates. This value
can be measured by the difference in the rates
and amortized over the life of the debt issue.
Patents, Nonpatented Techr~n1.y, Trademarks, Trade Names and Franchises, etc.-Since
the value of a particular patent, nonpatented technology or trademark, etc., is unique to the owner
of that item, valuation by reference to the net
income generated by the asset is probably the
most appropriate method. If the asset is licensed
to a third party, calculation of the value may be
made by reference to the income generated by the
licenses or royalties after allowing for all costs
related to the collection of the liccnse or royalty

income. If, on the other hand, the intangible asset
is used in the target's business, the net income

from the sale of products associated with the
intangible assets should be calculated. The stream
of income thus determined should be discounted
to calculate a net present value assignable to the
intangible asset.
Amortization for amounts assigned to patents
would be based upon the remaining patent life. 0 4
Amortization of values assigned to nonpatented
technology is more difficult as there is no fixed
period of usefulness. 03 In order to claim amortization on amounts allocated to nonpatented
technology, the taxpayer would have to be prepared to show that the technology would become
obsolete or of no further use after a certain period
of time.
Nonpatented technology exists quite frequently
in manufacturing companies. Essentially, it is
valuable technology or "know how" that cannot
be patented or a decision has been made not to
apply for a patent on the particular process. The
tax benefit rule should always be considered
when identifying potential technologies for valuation as it is likely the cost to develop the process
has been expensed previously and may therefore
be recaptured under the tax benefit -ule.

Contingent Purchase Price
Considerations
It is quite common for acquisitions to be
structured with some part of the purchase price
contingent upon a variety of events. Most contingencies relate to the achievement of significant
assumptions built into the buyer's purchase rationale, such as achievement of certain levels of
sales, profitability or return on investment. These
contingent payments are generally structured as
"insurance" to the buyer, such that if certain
goals are not met, his purchase price is not adversely affected.
Whenever some part of the purchase price is
contingent and payable more than one year from
the date of sale, Section 483 must be considered.
Section 483(b), as amended by the Tax Reform
Act of 1984,1" provides for imputed interest
where the stated interest on the future payments
is less than 110 percent of the applicable federal
rate determined under Section 1274(d). Section
483(d)(4) excludes contingent payments related
to patents from the application of the imputed
interest rules.
The effect of the imputed interest rules is
generally favorable to the buyer. To the extent
that a portion of a future payment is determined
to be imputed interest, the buyer receives an interest deduction at the time of payment. The
remainder of the payment must then be analyzed
to determine what the tax treatment is at that
future date.
' See e. g., Kraft Foods Company, CCH Dec. 20,121,

21 TC 513, 591 (1954), rev'd on different grounds, 56-I
usTc l 9428,232 F. 2d 118 (1956).
' See e. g., Illi.ois Cereal Mills, Inc. v. Cornndrioser,
note 4,supra, 46 TCM at 1022.
I"TRA of 1984, Section 41(b).
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In an asset purchase where the buyer and
seller have agreed to the allocation of the purchase price among the various assets, a contingent payment may be related to a specific asset.
Also, where a contir gent payment is based upon
income from a certin asset, such as a patent or
trademark, the allocation can be made directly.
On the other hand, where no agreement exists
between buyer and seller as to allocation of the
purchase price, it is possible the IRS may assert
the contingent consideration is additional goodwill. This would especially be true where goodwill or going concern value are determined under
the residual method, as discussed above. It is
therefore very important that the purchase contract relate contingent payments to specific assets
being acquired.
The tax treatment of contingent payments
to the purchaser varies with the underlying asset
to which it is ultimately assigned. It is useful to
discuss briefly the tax effects relative to various
categories of assets.
Franchises, Trademarks and Trade Names.The result of the operation of Section 1253 and
the related proposed regulations can be very
beneficial to the contingent payor who acquires
a business with significant franchises, trademarks
or trade names. Section 1253 allows a deduction
under Section 162(a) to the purchaser for contingent amounts paid for franchises, trademarks
and trade names and the seller is deemed to have
received ordinary income. An exception to this
rule is provided for sports franchises.' 07
In an acquisition where Section 1253 property
is acquired as part of the entire trade or business,
proposed regulations discuss how contingent payments are allocated among all assets acquired.' 0 8
The regulations specify that an allocation is made
on the basis of facts and circumstances of the
particular case, including any written agreement
between the seller and purchaser. If there is no
written agreement and the facts and circumstances do not otherwise indicate, an allocation
may be made among the intangibles acquired with
the business, including goodwill, franchises, trademarks or trade names. The regulations go on to
provide that an allocation of the contingent payment to Section 1253 assets would be appropriate,
lacking any other contrary facts or circumstances.
It should be noted that, although technically
the rules of Section 483 would cc ver contingent
payments on Section 1253 assets, the operation
of Section 483 generally has no effect on the purchaser, as the entire payment is treated as an
ordinary deduction.
Other Intangible and Tangible Assets.-Contingent payments by their nature are generally
not susceptible to valuation at the time of an
acquisition and, as such, are not included in the
basis of property acquired."
At the time the
contingency becomes fixed, the purchaser receives
additional basis in the assets acq!,.-e'' l l
Recovery of the additional amount paid for
income tax purposes depends upon the nature of
December, 1984

the underlying asset to which the payment is related and whether the asset is depreciable or
amortizable. The method followed in Associated
Patentees, Inc. v. Commissioner generally prescribes the manner in which certain assets not
eligible for ACRS should be amortized. The
court in Associated Patentees allowed as amortization the amount of contingent royalty paid for the
year. Although the case was decided on an
acquisition of patents, the same method has been
extended to other assets, both tangible and intangible."' It seems that this method may be
applied where the contingent payments are made
over the period which approximates the useful
life of the related asset. Where the contingent
payments are paid over a shorter period than
the asset's useful life, the additional basis should
be recovered over the assets remaining useful
life on a straight-line basis.
In the event contingent payments are made
with respect to property qualifying under ACRS,
proposed regulations under Section 168 discuss
the method of recovery. The ceguilations provide
that the resulting increase in basis results in a
redetermined adjusted basis and a redetermined
applicable percentage. 1 2 The effect of these rules
is to fractionally increase the otherwise fixed
percentages provided under the ACRS system.
Contingent payments made in years after the end
of the recovery period would be expensed as paid.
Contingent Payments and Section 338.--Although regulations under Section 338 have not
been published that d:iscuss allocation of purchase price or the effect of subsequent contingent
payments, it would appear contingent payments
on stock purchases could be applied to the underlying assets acquired.11 3 To avoid reallocation of
the contingent payment over the all assets acquired, it is recommended that the contingency be
identified with specific assets. Further, for the
reasons pointed out above, the use of the residual
method for determining going concern value or
goodwill is not recommended where contingent
payments may be made.

Summary
In summary, it may be concluded that creative, aggressive acquirers are carving out new
frontier6 in taxable purchases by first resolving
the effects of the tax benefit rule, Section 338 and
the issues of going concern and goodwill and then
reaching for new opportunities to assign values
to items which can provide significant future income tax benefits. a
" Section 1253(e).
'=Prop. Reg. § 1.1253-1 (d).

"'See e. g., Rev. Rut. 55-675, 1955-2 CB 567.
"Associated Patentees, Inc., CCH Dec. 14,440, 4 TC
979 (1945), acq. 1959-2 CB 3.
"'See e. g., H. Edw,'ard Woilf, CCI- Dec. 15,370, 7 TC
717 (1946), acq,, 1947-1 CB 4; A. B. Innis, CCH Dec.
14,(67(.\1), 4 TCM 729 (1945).
n: Prop. Re7. § 1.168-2(,1)13).
'*See Rev. Rid. 67-136, 1967-1 CB 58.
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